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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 19000 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State 
of Utah against Elroy Tillman charging him with Murder in the 
First Degree, a capital offense, pursuant to Section 76-5-202, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 14, 1984, a jury found appellant guilty 
as charged and on January 20, 1983, the same jury found for the 
death penalty and on February 4, 1983, the trial court sentenced 
appellant to death by shooting. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the 
judgment of guilt rendered at trial, reversing the sentence of 
death and remanding the case for a new trial, for new sentencing 
procedures or for the imposition of a life sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on May 26, 1982, at about Bryant Avenue and 1300 East, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, Mark Allen Schoenfeld received several 
blows to the head with a blunt instrument and died sometime later 
as a result of asphyxiation caused by a burning mattress. 
The dead victim was discovered by the State's first 
witness, Craig A. Jones, who had smelled smoke about 4 a.m., 
investigated, and some time later at 6:10 a.m. entered the 
victim's apartment through the partially ajar front door. The 
witness warned the downstairs occupants and had his wife call 
the Fire Department. Through the witness, the State introduced 
State's which depict the building exterior. (Tr. 
1/4/83, 111-128) (All references to transcript are 1983 dates 
of trial with the appropriate page numbers.) 
Dr. Monique Riser, Assistant Medical Examiner, 
conducted an autopsy on tne victim after viewing the body at 
the scene (see State's Exhibits 6-8, 10, 11) and determined that 
the cause of death was however, several blows to 
the head contributed to the death and, of themselves, the blows 
could have resulted Ila. i36) as could the burning 
injuries solely cause death. 1J4) The witness concluded 
three to six blows were struck, none of which left residue or 
imprinted fabric in the wounds, although if a shirt had been 
placed over the victim's head when the blows were struck, the 
witness in most cases would have expected to see fabric imprint. 
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(!_cl_. 147-153) The blows were indistinguishable with respect 
to apparent force. (.!_Q. 15 6) Times of death were narrowed 
down to 12 midnight to 1 a.m. (Tr. 1/5, 8-10) 
Kenneth Dailey, an arson investigator, testified he 
investigated the subject fire on the morning of May 26, 1982, 
and determined the point of origin was along the perimeter of 
the mattress on which the victim was found. The witness, through 
State's Exhibit 18, was able to pinpoint the origin of the fire 
at the bottom of the mattress. (Id. 25-47) 
Clarence Montgomery of the Woods Cross Police 
Department testified that on April 13, 1982, he observed an axe 
in the back of the vehicle driven by appellant. The axe handle 
had been wrapped with black tape and the axe head itself was 
bigger than a Boy Scout hatchet. (Id. 96-104) 
Lori Groneman, age 22, then testified she had known 
appellant for five and one-half years and had lived with the 
appellant in the State of California and Utah as late as August 
of 1980. She began dating the victim steadily in February, 1982, 
although she had sexual relations with appellant as late as 
January, 1982. (Id. 101-119) 
The witness testified she received daily calls from 
appellant after she terminated the relationship in January of 
1982 and on occasion saw defendant around Sperry Univac where 
she was employed. She recalled a threatening sign found on her 
front lawn during September, 1980, which she attributed to 
appellant because of unique writing characteristics. She also 
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indicated sugar was put into the yas of her car and that 
appellant had claimed automoh1le during the same week. 
(Id. 120-135) 
During March of 1982 the witness received threatening 
phone calls from a female caller, and in April of 1981 she 
received a pistol from appellant. She also asserted appellant 
followed her three times during a two year span. (!.9_. 136-
149) 
Lori Groneman testified she went to the victim's home 
after work on May 25, 1982, and arrived there with the victim 
between 5:20 and 6 p.m., had dinner consisting of barbequed shish 
kebabs shortly before 10 p.m. and was taken home by the victim 
approximately 11 p.m. with a 20- or 25-minute driving time one 
way. (Id. 150-170) 
She also stated the appellant had threatened her life 
in 1980 on two occasions, and in 1982 the appellant had pushed 
her against a car during an argument. 170-178) The 
witness said she recognized the voice of Carla Sagars after 
meeting her in person at the County Attorney's office. 
178-188) 
During proceedings on January 6, 1983, Ms. Groneman 
testified to numerous calls between her and the appellant, 
and detailed at somE lengtr her op1n1on of appellant's threats, 
misconduct of dubious impact which, although allegedly reported 
to police, never resulted in any arrest or police action. (Tr. 
1/6, 114-133) 
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She further testified about a gun appellant gave her 
in April, 1981, and the fact she bought a gun herself in March, 
1982. The witness countless times volunteered information about 
her fears of appellant. (See for illustration only Tr. 1/6, 
121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 140, 146-147, 148.) 
The thrust of the witness' testimony was that she and 
the appellant had a tumultuous relationship for some years 
resulting in the witness' fear of appellant. 
With respect to the alleged "burglary" of the victim's 
residence involving some stereo speakers, the witness testified 
that appellant's speakers at all times remained at the home of 
the witness with the knowledge of appellant. (Id. 167) 
Carla Sagars, the State's immunized key witness, 
testified on January 6th (Tr. 1/6, 191, et seq.) that as an 
employee of the Federal Government she met appellant in August 
of 1980 and thereafter became romantically involved with 
appellant. 198) Approximately two to three months before 
the homicide, Ms. Sagars began placing calls to Lori Groneman's 
residence to convey threats or questions allegedly at appellant's 
request. 200-206) Appellant was not present with the 
witness when calls were made. The witness also testified that 
on two occasions she had purchased a .22 caliber revolver, shot 
one of them in appellant's presence and discussed silencers with 
the appellant. 208-222) She alleged the appellant said 
he was going to make a silencer. 223-227) She further 
testified she and appellant drove past the victim's house a 
number of times between Marc,,, and the day of the homicide 
(May, 1982); that she obtained Lhe victim's name from a new car 
sticker; and that she and appellant discussed explosives being 
placed on the victim's car. 228-236) She indicated a 
couple of attempts were made to discharge a bomb of some sort. 
237-243) Poisoning was discussed by the witness and 
appellant 243-248), and the witness snooped around the 
victim's residence at appellant's request. 252-256) 
These activities culminated in Carla Sagars going to the victim's 
house to kill him. (!.9_. 260-263) The witness recounted that 
appellant threatened to "do it" himself. (Id. 265) 
On direct examination Carla Sagars testified at length 
concerning the details of the homicide commencing with her work 
day 276) and ending with her being questioned by 
detectives some days later. ( !9.. 3 3 3) According to the 
witness, no mention was made by appellant or the witness at any 
time prior to or during the homicide that the purpose of entry 
into the victim's residence was to obtain property. 
372) 
(Id. 369-
Ms. Sagars stated appellant planned to enter the 
victim's house and K1LL n1m on the spot. (Id. 417-419) Arson 
or fires were not discussed. (_!Q. 420) Some five hours were 
spent by Ms. Sagars and the appellant in loitering about or 
inside victim's residence during which time Ms. Sagars attempted 
to use the telephone or walk around. She did not attempt to 
warn anyone or call police for fear of losing her JOb or 
7 
perceived revenge from appellant. (Id. 421, 430, 432) A gas 
can was carried by appellant to the victim's apartment front 
door and returned to the government automobile after the 
homicide. The gas can was not observed thereafter. (Id. 444-
449) Ms. Sagars stated she crawled into the victim's bedroom, 
retreated, turned on the kitchen light, re-entered the area and 
observed the victim breathing but wounded as a result of one 
blow. (_!.2_. 450-462) Two blows were heard by Ms. Sagars. 
(_!.2_. 462) Ms. Sagars and appellant left taking a towel, 
perhaps a shirt, the axe and a gas can with them. Little 
conversation occurred during the trip home or while discarding 
the incriminating evidence. (Id. 467-473) Ms. Sagars admitted 
to still having some of appellant's gloves in her possession. 
(Id. 476) 
Several days after the homicide, Ms. Sagars told police 
officers she had been with appellant the night of the homicide 
and that she and appellant had driven to Pineview Reservoir and 
in the direction of Logan. (ls!. 479-480) She never tried 
to contact appellant after the homicide. (Id. 482-483) She 
"confessed" to Detective Chapman that appellant had committed 
the homicide after Miranda-type warnings. (Id. 484-485) 
Ms. Sagars counseled appellant against hitting the 
victim again and opined that the fire should kill him; that the 
bathroom light should be turned off; that the fire might be a 
good cover-up for a homicide; that a "smoking in bed" theory 
might work; and that no property should be taken during the 
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crime. 488-493) She Jµn1ed involvement in setting the 
fire, although she placed the point of origin away from her 
position and toward appellant's position (but cf. the testimony 
of Kenneth Dailey, supra). 493) 
On redirect and re-cross, Ms. Sagars indicated the 
appellant had blood splatters on his jacket although this 
evidence wasn't previously disclosed in recorded statements. 
(Id. 502-512) 
George Groneman testified that during April, 1982, 
and thereafter, he logged and recorded incoming phone calls 
because of the harassing nature of the calls. (Tr. 1/10, 3-17) 
Mr. Groneman had told appellant phone calls were being recorded. 
A threatening sign reportedly was found by family 
members in early 1982 (cf. Lori Groneman's testimony referring 
to September, 1980), although the witness was not sure of the 
precise time frame. 45) 
Kent Haden testified that he was appellant's supervisor 
during employment wherein appellant installed glass into frames, 
handled warehousing, etc. (Tr. 1/10, 50-62) Appellant was 
punctual, a good worker and involved in semi-skilled operations 
requiring some ability to measure and work with metal. 
Appellant used or had access to brown cotton gloves similar to 
State's Exhibits 13 and 15. (Ibid.) 
Brian Taylor, Bountiful Police Officer, testified he 
took reports of threatening phone calls from Lori Groneman on 
March 27, 1981, and a few days later investigated Ms. Groneman's 
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complaint of sugar in the gas tank of her automobile. 
80-83) 
(Tr. 1/10, 
Marty Vuyk, Salt Lake City Police Department, testified 
that he investigated the homicide in question commencing about 
6:30 a.m., May 26, 1982. He testified the body had not been 
moved prior to photographing (Tr. 1/10, 92); that he accompanied 
Ms. Sagars and other detectives to an area where burned material 
was recovered 92-96) that he directed unsuccessful 
attempts to recover an axe at the north Redwood Road location 
indicated by Ms. Sagars (Id. 97-99); that gloves were recovered 
at a point further north on Redwood Road (Id. 100); and laid 
foundation for the State's Exhibits consisting of a burned shirt 
and towel and a diagram of the area. (Id. 100-102) He further 
testified no usable prints were found at the homicide scene. 
106-107) The burned shirt was not identifiable as a man's 
or woman's shirt. (Id. 109) 
Steve Chapman, Salt Lake City Police Department, 
testified he met Carla Sagars at the airport on May 28, 1982, 
took statements and procured physical evidence as a result of 
those statements. (Tr. 1/10, 126-132). He obtained a modified 
.22 caliber revolver from Ms. Sagars and a .22 caliber revolver 
from Ms. Groneman. 132-133) Ms. Sagars gave different 
stories, the first story being consistent with a statement 
obtained from appellant on May 26, 1982. 133-142) In 
that statement, appellant essentially told Detective Chapman 
the following salient facts: he understood his Miranda rights 
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and would talk; he didn't know the victim; he had never been 
in the area of the homicide; he knew Carla Sagars and had spent 
and night in question with Ms. Sagars by going to Pineview 
Reservoir by automobile; he arrived home between 11:45 and 12 
[p.m.]; that it was Ms. Sagars' idea to go to Pineview; he didn't 
drink alcohol; he never saw Ms. Sagars leave that night; he awoke 
at 7 a.m. and woke his roommate; he had spoken to Lori Groneman 
as late as May 25, 1982; he had no desire to continue any 
relationship with Lori Groneman; on the morning of May 26, 1982, 
he had gone to Ms. Sagars' apartment, his apartment, the airport 
and back to his apartment; he had a picture of Ms. Groneman but 
not of Ms. Sagars; he was a close acquaintance of Ms. Sagars 
and would probably see her when she returned; he was friends 
with Scribner; he had a telephone number for Lori Groneman and 
her father's business phone; and that his roommate did not see 
him return home on the evening of May 25, 1982. (Id. 137-158) 
Detective Chapman was allowed to testify, over 
objection, that the Sagars' version was consistent with his 
observation of the crime scene. (Id. 159) He recounted how 
Ms. Sagars had led him to the location of various items of 
physical evidence. 160-167) On cross-examination he 
testified that the gun obtained from Ms. Sagars appeared operable 
but had been modified with a standard plumbing pipe on the 
barrel. 175-179) Lab tests of Ms. Sagars' clothes were 
performed, but since the clothes had been washed or possibly 
were not worn by Ms. Sagars on the night of the homicide, the 
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tests proved inconclusive. (Id. 175) He notes that appellant 
had mentioned going to Ms. Sagars' apartment the evening of May 
25, 1982 181), but later retracted that statement. (Tr. 
1/11, 4-5) Detective Chapman did not directly ask appellant 
if Ms. Sagars could have slipped out during the night. (Tr. 
1/10, 88) Appellant specifically denied killing anyone when 
prodded by the witness to the effect that the victim had 
mentioned the appellant's name to Detective Chapman shortly 
before dying. 185-188) The witness was unable to locate 
physical evidence of appellant's presence at the scene such as 
hair or fingerprints. (Id. 189-190) No witnesses, other than 
Ms. Sagars, were found to place appellant at the scene or the 
automobile nearby. {Id. 189) 
Detective Chapman further testified that Carla Sagars 
recanted her initial story when confronted with proof that police 
knew the source of phone calls and that appellant had "used 
several people." (Id. 194-196) She told her story and was 
granted immunity without arrest or incarceration. 
192-202) 
Detective Chapman confirmed that Ms. Sagars had stated 
the fire was started at the foot of the victim's bed, more 
towards the east side vis-a-vis the west side. (Id. 196-197) 
He also confirmed that Ms. Sagars had not, during the 
investigation, mentioned the fact appellant had crawled out of 
the car window, had not mentioned that appellant had a watch, 
had not mentioned that appellant had a gasoline can, had not 
12 
mentioned that appellant had turned on the kitchen light, and 
had not mentioned that it was Sagars' idea to light the bed on 
fire. (.!_-9_. 205-207) Neither had she mentioned anything about 
blood on appellant's jacket. (Ibid.) 
On redirect Detective Chapman stated he had not asked 
specific questions concerning the omissions noted, supra (Id. 
209-212), and on re-cross he further defined appellant's 
statements concerning Ms. Sagars' potential absence from 
appellant during the time of the homicide. (See Tr. 1/11, 7-11) 
Portions of the tape recording of appellant's statement 
were inaudible or undecipherable. (.!_.9.. 10-13) 
Oscar Henderson, a firearms expert, testified he had 
examined the modified .22 caliber revolver and produced a 
commercially-made silencer for illustration of the effect of 
such modifications. (Id. 19-35) 
Martha Kerr, serologist, testified that in examining 
the pair of brown gloves in evidence, she detected human blood. 
(.!_£. 37) She examined the clothing submitted by Ms. Sagars 
some time after the homicide and detected no blood. She found 
no negroid hairs or any hairs on such items. (Id. 3 9) The 
victim's pull-over sweater (Exhibit 38) had human blood on it 
similar to the victim's blood. (_!.-9_. 3 9) She did not examine 
the gloves for negroid hairs and was not requested to do so. 
(Id. 49-50) 
Robert Brinkman testified as an explosives expert that 
he received certain residue from Detective Chapman, examined 
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the same and concluded the residue contained ammonium nitrates. 
Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil or gasoline in mixture can be 
explosive. (Tr. 1/11, 67-84) 
The State rested and appellant called Dan George who 
testified that in connection with his employment at a Bountiful 
auto dealership, he had received reports that Lori Groneman's 
car had sugar in the gas tank. He examined the affected parts 
and concluded sugar had been placed into the gasoline tank of 
the car. He found no evidence of ground glass. (Tr. 1/12, 4-9) 
Donald Kartchner, an employee of an engineering firm, 
testified he had examined a fuel filter submitted for examination 
and determined sugar was present. He found no ground glass, 
although extensive analysis was not conducted. (Id. 11-18) 
Mark Welch, called by appellant, testified he had 
become appellant's roommate during March of 1982, in part because 
of similarity in the fastidious housekeeping habits of the two 
men. 18-22) There were no hand tools in the apartment 
except for a cresent wrench, a pair of pliers and some 
screwdrivers. 23) There was no axe or hatchet. 
24) Mr. Welch saw appellant in the morning on May 25, 1982, 
and again at 4:30 p.m. that day. He testified Carla Sagars 
arrived between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. that day wearing a 
long-sleeved white shirt, not the terrycloth blue-trimmed shirt 
labeled Defense Exhibit 42. (Id. 27-29) 
After Ms. Sagars and appellant went to K-Mart and 
returned, Mr. Welch invited the two to eat dinner at the 
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apartment. A friend dropped by and at approximately 7:00-7:30 
p.m., appellant and Ms. Sagars left. Appellant stated he and 
Ms. Sagars were going to drive to Ogden. (I.£. 29-31) 
Mr. Welch testified he saw appellant return between 
10:30 and 11:00 p.m., although he did not see Carla Sagars at 
that time. He further testified he heard appellant in the 
bathroom about half an hour afterwards but did not observe or 
hear Ms. Sagars in the apartment that night. (!2· 32-34) 
According to Mr. Welch, Ms. Sagars would spend nights with 
appellant on a fairly regular basis. (!2· 36) Ms. Sagars 
performed laundry chores for appellant and had access to 
appellant's room and closet. (Id. 37) He also indicated Ms. 
Groneman frequently called for appellant, in fact, almost daily. 
(1.2. 38) Appellant had informed the witness of an intention 
to return to California in the fall of 1982 and that appellant's 
relationship with Ms. Sagars was ending. (Id. 39-41) On May 
24, 1982, Mr. Welch had occasion to view the trunk of the 
Oldsmobile Cutlass and saw no gasoline can or hatchet. (!2· 
41-42) 
Mr. Welch had given a sworn statement on May 26, 1982, 
wherein he had indicated appellant returned at 11 p.m. on May 
25, 1982, but Mr. Welch did not then state, nor at trial, that 
he saw Ms. Sagars in the apartment during the early morning hours 
of May 26, 1982. (1.2. 57-59) Appellant told Mr. Welch that 
Ms. Sagars had spent the night in the apartment. (_!.Q· 62) 
Mr. Welch denied that appellant harassed Lori Groneman on the 
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telephone or vice-versa. (Id. 73) He indicated that appellant 
had sole access to a storage shed which could have contained 
hatchets, gas cans, ammonia nitrate, etc. (.!..9_. 74-75) Mr. 
Welch also stated that George Groneman had called appellant 
several times shortly before the homicide. (.!..9_. 90-91) The 
witness brought and identified the shirt which he believed 
appellant wore on the night of May 25, 1982. (Id. 97-101) 
During "in camera" proceedings, Sergeant Kenneth Thirsk 
was admonished by the Court and counsel to abstain from referring 
to any polygraph examination of Carla Sagars. (Tr. 1/12, 
104-107) The parties stipulated a prefer and objections to 
polygraph testimony would be forthcoming. 
Sergeant Thirsk testified to the jury he had discussed 
Ms. Sagars' testimony with Ms. Sagars a few days before trial 
commenced. In response to the accusation by Sergeant Thirsk 
that he did not believe Ms. Sagars' story, (actually based on 
polygraph results of which the jury was not aware), the following 
colloquy occurred: 
Q Would you, Officer, be so kind as to tell 
the jury and the Court the content of that 
conversation as best you can recall, relating 
to your questions and her answers in response 
thereto? 
A The conversation regarded Carla's 
particular activities herself during the 
incident at Mark Schoenfeld's home. During 
that conversation at one point I told her 
that I did not believe her answers to my 
questions and told her that I believed she 
had in fact struck Mark and I made that 
accusation. 
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Q Did she respond t0 thAt Accusation? 
A Yes, she did. 
Q And what was her response? 
A Her response was, "If you want me to say 
I hit him, I will." 
I then said, 
unless it's 
happened." 
"I don't want you to say that 
the truth. Tell me what 
She said, "I will testify that I hit him 
if that's what you want." 
I then asked her, "How many times did you 
hit him," and she responded, "Twice." 
I then asked, "Which side did you hit him?" 
She said, "The left side." 
I then asked, "Which side of the bed were 
you on?" 
And she said, "I don't recall." 
I then asked, "Did Tillman hand you the 
weapon?" 
Her response was, "He must have." 
I then asked, "Did Tillman tell you to hit 
Mark?" 
Her response was, "He must have." 
I then told her I didn't want to know what 
must have happened, I wanted to know what 
did happen. Her response was, "I don't know 
why I am telling you this, it isn't true 
anyway. I .J1,)n't h1t him." (_!.Q. 110-111) 
Sergeant Thirsk also recounted that Carla Sagars had 
admitted that she was in the victim's room the moment blows were 
struck contrary to a previous denial of having been in the room 
at that time. (.!_-9_. 112-113) The witness noted other 
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inconsistencies in Ms. Sagars' responses during the two 
(undisclosed polygraph) interrogations such as mentioning the 
kitchen light switch in the second interrogation but not in the 
first (l2· 114-115), and mentioning turning off a bathroom 
light in the second interrogation, but not in the previous 
interrogation. (l2· 116) Sergeant Thirsk noted 
inconsistencies involving the gas can, revolver and light 
switch. (Id. 118) 
Appellant rested, having reserved "in camera" the 
proffer of the polygraph evidence. 
The State recalled Lori Groneman as a rebuttal 
witness. She testified appellant customarily shaved his body 
hair including hair on his hands although he appeared not to 
have done so before or during the trial. (Tr. 1/12, 135-136) 
On cross-examination Ms. Groneman admitted that appellant had 
returned her calls, according to taped telephone conversations, 
and that she had no way of knowing the existence or lack of body 
hair during May of 1982. (Id. 137-138) 
The parties rested, having reserved appellant's proffer 
of polygraph evidence for the next day. The jury was dismissed 
until January 14, 1982, at 9 a.m. (Tr. 1/12, 138-140) 
On January 13, 1982, appellant proffered the testimony 
ul Dr. Kircher and Sergeant Thirsk relative to polygraph 
examinations in general and Ms. Sagars' deceptive performance 
in a polygraph conducted January 3, 1982, two days before trial. 
\See generally Tr. 1/13, et seq.) On January 3, 1982, Sergeant 
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Thirsk conducted a polygraph examination of Carla Sagars. He 
concluded she was deceptive in denying relevant questions 5 and 
7 set forth below: 
Question 5: At the exact instance any of 
the blows were struck, were you holding the 
weapon? 
Question 6: Was the weapon ever in your 
possession when Mark was struck with it? 
(Id. 89) 
Sergeant Thirsk received verification of his 
conclusions from three other polygraph examiners, all of whom 
were law enforcement employees. (Id. 86, 90-91) 
Closing arguments and jury instructions were conducted 
January 14, 1983. 
On January 14, 1983, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty upon one count of criminal homicide, murder in the first 
degree, a capital offense. On January 20, 1983, the case 
reconvened for the "penalty phase." Prior to commencement of 
the proceedings, appellant had filed a motion to admit evidence 
of Ms. Sagars' polygraph. (Record at 281) 
Charles Illsley, a sergeant at West Valley City Police 
Department, testified as a fingerprint expert over appellant's 
objection and stated that in his opinion the fingerprints of 
appellant were the same as the fingerprints contained in the 
exemplified and certified copies of fingerprints sent to the 
witness by various correctional and judicial agencies. The 
witness also prepared a large exhibit listing appellant's 
purported convictions in other jurisdictions. (Tr. 1/20, 5-16) 
19 
Appellant renewed his objection to evidence of past convictions. 
(Id. 67-68) 
William T. Bailey testified that as a federal probation 
officer he first met appellant in 1980 when appellant was 
released from a federal halfway house to probation. (Tr. 1/20, 
18) Over objection, Mr. Bailey testified that parolees sign 
a parole agreement which prohibits the usual and sundry 
activities generally proscribed of parolees, including the 
possession of firearms or explosives. (Id. 20) 
The State rested. Appellant called Roscoe Fowler, 
appellant's brother, who testified that appellant fulfilled the 
father role in his life, as well as the role of brother. (Id. 
24-35) 
Mark Welch testified that appellant gave of himself 
willingly, was a positive influence in the witness' life and 
would never become indebted to the witness for one red cent. 
( !.9.. 3 8- 4 0) Mr. Welch recounted how appellant strove to be 
with his (appellant's) son and had a close family relationship. 
Appellant assisted others and gave his time voluntarily to those 
in need. (Id. 40-43) 
Creola Fowler, appellant's mother, testified that 
appellant was the fifth child out of eight children. Appellant 
never had the benefit of a father. She never observed any 
violent behavior by appellant other than the usual schoolyard 
scraps of a young boy. She opined that God should judge her 
son, not society at this trial. Although appellant's mother 
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Detecting anything?" (Tr. l '14, 28) 
This comment 1mpl1ed or inferred that appel•ant had 
r .. •t srlc)Wn remorse of any Kind because he nad not test1f1ed in 
is own behalf, and therefore, ne was obv1ous:y guilty. Such 
comment might nave escaped unnoticed by the iury; 
w0v0r, the comment was preceded by comments ostensibly directed 
·,• ,·cir ici Sagars but clearly designed to impress the iury that 
1; • • • .1 n t .,. ci s g u 1 l t '/ because he ex er c is e d a cons t i tut ion a 1 
r , J i t_ • That comment was: 
Even tnougn you may say to yourselves, 
Ccirla Sagars isn't any better than Elroy 
Tillman, she did have a heart and she did 
tell tl1e truth, and she 01dn't demand 
1mmun1t:i:, snP didn't 
,Tr .. 14, 
·L: _, m p :i r 1 n q , 1 n o n e s e n t e n c e , t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e 
w1tr. the conduct of appellant at trial in the 
const1tut1onal rights clearly inferred the 
·' l :"'. .as t:.roy Tillman nas done (to indicate 
J':.tJ t'--J Jetense counsel• s sumrnat1on 
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to the jury in the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecuting 
attorney again referred to appellant's lack of remorse. 
Appellant submits that these comments were designed to penalize 
appellant's failure to testify in his own defense; that they 
had that express effect; and that they therefore deprived 
appellant of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. They 
impermissibly tainted the process which resulted in the jury 
returning a verdict of death despite the unextraordinary 
circumstances of this case. As a result, this Court should set 
aside the finding of guilt and/or the verdict of death, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
The central offending comment of counsel during penalty 
is at lines 1 through 15 of page 114 (Tr. 1/20). And, though 
the statement suffers the failure of precise syntax common to 
oral expression, the sense of the statement is this: 
.there is not a system [for the 
control and governance of human affairs] 
on the face of the earth--including the 
mosaic law or the law of Christianity--that 
will work unless the individual sole (sic) 
wishes it to work. [Mr. Tillman's conduct, 
as demonstrated by his felony record 
indicates that he does not respect any such 
system]. [He has rebelled] against the most 
sacred of obligations, to protect human 
life. . [and] all the other things that 
Elroy Tillman has broken along the way. 
[N]o system in the world will work without 
the person himself--humility-wise and with 
remorse--saying, "I want it to work." And 
you haven't heard Elroy Tillman say that. 
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Reduced to syllogistic form, counsel's argument was this: 
By his prior conduct Tillman has 
demonstrated that he has no respect for the 
law and is therefore likely to continue to 
pose a serious threat to society. Were he 
at least to speak to you and declare his 
willingness to abide the law, then there 
might be some hope of rehabilitating him. 
But he hasn't stood before you and expressed 
humility or remorse, or sworn that he will 
honor the sacred obligation to protect human 
life and conform his actions to the rules. 
Therefore, you should require his death. 
Though disagreeing with the rationale of the argument, appellant 
acknowledges its compelling force and persuasiveness. State's 
counsel was an articulate and forceful advocate. It is precisely 
because the argument is so persuasive that it has repeatedly 
been held to impermissibly penalize the right to remain silent 
and thus deny due process. 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed.2d 
106, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment, in its direct application to the federal government 
and its bearing on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
expressly forbids comment by the prosecution on the accused's 
silence. In specifying the reasons for the Court's holding, 
Justice Douglas said: 
.comment on the refusal to testify 
is a remnant of the "inquisitorial system 
of criminal justice," [citation omitted] 
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is 
a penalty imposed by courts for exercising 
a constitutional privilege. It cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion 
costly. 
* * * 
Defendant contends that the reason a 
defendant refuses to testify is that his 
prior convictions will be introduced in 
evidence to impeach him [statutory citations 
omitted] and not that he is unable to deny 
the accusations. It is true that the 
defendant might fear that his prior 
convictions will prejudice the jury, and 
that therefore another possible inference 
can be drawn from his refusal to take the 
stand. [Internal references omitted.] 
This holding has never been reversed or substantially modified. 
In commenting on the application of the rule to particular 
factual contexts, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. 
Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246 (1977), that: 
To reverse for improper comment by the 
prosecutor, we must find one of two things: 
that "the prosecutor's manifest intention 
was to comment upon the accused's failure 
to testify" or that the remark was "of such 
a character that the jury would naturally 
and necessarily take it to be a comment on 
the failure of the accused to testify." 
Id. at 1249 
705, B7 S.Ct. B24 (1967), the Supreme Court held that (1) 
violation of the Griffin rule is constitutional error and that 
once the error has been proven the burden is on the state to 
show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In 390 U.S. 523, 20 L.Ed.2d Bl, BBS.Ct. 
1133 (196B), rehearing denied 391 U.S. 929, the Supreme Court 
reiterated its allegiance to strict application of the Griffin 
rule. There, improper comments had been made and the conviction 
was challenged by Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus which was granted 
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hy the U.S. District Court. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The 
supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Writ, saying: 
We agree with Judge Ely that comment 
on a defendant's failure to testify cannot 
be labeled harmless error in a case where 
such comment is extensive, where an inference 
of guilt from silence is stressed to the 
jury as a basis of conviction, and where 
there is evidence that could have supported 
acquittal. We find this is such a case. 
Id. 390 U.S. at 523-524 
Though counsel's unlawful comment during penalty is 
found in a single unrepeated sentence, that sentence formed the 
basis of an extensive, well-reasoned and logically persuasive 
argument in favor of death and drew further sustenance from prior 
references during the guilt phase. He made it plain to the jury 
that death was the appropriate penalty because defendant had 
not verbally manifest his intent to comply with society's rules 
of conduct in the future should he be permitted to live. 
Finally, under the Court's instructions, the jury was not 
permitted to return a verdict of death unless it found, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that death was the only appropriate 
alternative. We certainly cannot be certain beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the State's improper argument did not influence the 
Jury to return its verdict mandating the ultimate penalty. The 
edicts of the highest court in the land require relief in this 
case. 
Counsel's argument was closely similar in content and 
identical in thrust to the penalty phase argument found "most 
e g r e g i o us " i n t e 1 o a_'.:!, 2 9 8 S . E . 2 d 9 2 ( S • C. , 19 8 2) at 
2b 
95, set forth below: 
The solicitor urged the Jury to consider 
appellant's plea of not guilty as evidence 
that appellant lacked remorse. "Has anyone 
said to you he's sorry, sorry for what he 
did? .What have you been told up until 
you found him guilty. He has pled not 
guilty. As he sits in this courtroom, he 
is not guilty. .Is that someone who wants 
to be rehabilitated?" 
This argument was clearly improper, 
as no right is more fundamental than the 
right of an accused to plead not guilty and 
put the State to its proof. A defendant's 
exercise of his right to plead not guilty 
is never a permissible basis upon which to 
impose the death penalty; this is 
particularly true in a capital case in this 
state, where a defendant must plead not 
guilty to have his sentence determined by 
a jury. S.C. Code Ann., Section 16-3-20(B). 
Ibid. 
So. 2d (Fla., 1983), 34 
Cr.L.Rptr. 2166, similarly holding an inferred comment on 
defendant's silence is error. 
This court has spoken in State_.':'...:.._Eaton, 569 P.2d 
1114 (1977), saying: 
The error of principal concern here 
is defendant's claim of improper remarks 
of the prosecutor during his argument to 
the jury. The prosecutor stressed the fact 
that only the prosecution's key witness (the 
alleged buyer, Ken Goode) and the defendant 
"really know what took place in that house;" 
and then asked". .What does the defendant 
tell us?" He also stated that: "I listened 
to the entire defense in this case and never 
heard one shred of evidence from the 
defendant to prove any motive any reason 
that showed that Ken Goode was out to get 
blacks in this community." 
.We approve and reaffirm that duty 
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and privilege of analyzing the whole evidence 
as a general proposition. However, there 
is a point beyond which it must not go in 
regard to the defendant's constitutional 
right just referred to; and this includes 
that it should not be impaired or destroyed 
by making comments on the failure of the 
defendant to take the witness stand. 
It is to be noted that in the Kazda 
case, referred to above, the distinction 
we have just discussed was pointed out; and 
that although the prosecution did analyze 
the evidence, it made no such reference to 
the fact that the defendant did not testify 
as was done here. Upon a fair analysis of 
the prosecutor's remarks here, the conclusion 
cannot be escaped that it was but a thinly 
disguised attempt to do indirectly what the 
prosecutor know could not properly be done 
directly; that is, to comment on the fact 
that the defendant had chosen not to take 
the witness stand; and to persuade the jury 
to draw inferences as to his guilt because 
of his exercise of that constitutional 
privilege. 
Consistent with the nature of the 
criminal proceedings and the protections 
accorded those accused of crime under our 
law, including the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of the state to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
we believe that, on appeal, when there is 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the error 
below was prejudicial, that doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the defendant. This 
is especially true where the error involved 
is one which transgresses against the 
exercise of a constitutional right. 
Consequently, the rule which we have numerous 
times stated is that if the error is such 
as to justify a belief that it had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, in that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there may have been a different 
result, the the error should not be regarded 
as harmless; and conversely, if the error 
is such that it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it was harmless in that the result 
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would have been the same, tt1en the error 
should not be deemed prejudicial and warrant 
granting a new trial. 
When the defendant's attacks on his 
conviction are considered in the light of 
the foregoing principals, and in connection 
with the total picture as presented in this 
case, including the nature of the pivotal 
evidence of the state, which we advert to 
below, we cannot conclude with the required 
assurance that the matters complained of 
were not prejudicial. (Footnotes omitted.) 
More recently, this Court has made its view of such 
improper argument equally clear. 
P. 2d 146 (1981), the Court reversed defendant's conviction of 
two counts of aggravated robbery where in trial, defendant had 
argued that he was present at the scenes of the crimes but that 
he was an unwilling participant in the robberies. To rebut this 
defense, the prosecutor had adduced evidence and argued to the 
jury in rebuttal that after defendant had been arrested and 
Mirandized, he had failed to mention that fact in protest of 
his arrest. The Court held: 
The case that appears to be the 
controlling case is 426 
U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 
(1976). Even if it could be validly argued 
that defendant's objection and the court's 
attempt to cure the matter by striking the 
admonition were effective, this cannot be 
said about prosecutor's comments during his 
final argument. The continued attempts by 
the prosecutor to put the defendant's silence 
before the jury after his having been advised 
of his right to remain silent amounts to 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
The references to defendant's silence 
are fundamental error, which could have 
affected the result and are therefore 
29 
prejudicial. The reasons for extending this 
protection are adequately discussed in 
supra, and need not be repeated 
here. Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
See also 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah, 1982). Those 
rules having been made clear by the Court, we must turn to State 
v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (1980), wherein the Court specifically 
speaks to the level of care which must be exercised in the trial 
of capital cases to avoid any just criticism that the death 
penalty has been imposed arbitrarily or unfairly. 
Justice Wilkins: 
Scrupulous care must be exercised by 
the State in capital cases in both the 
guilt-determining and penalty phases in 
presentation of evidence and argument because 
of the acknowledged uniqueness of the death 
penalty. Citing Mr. Justice Stevens in 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 
(1976)-:-------------
That "scrupulous care" must extend to all facets of the trial 
process in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. A 
capital case requires even closer scrutiny than other trials 
and: 
. [t]he prosecutor's actions at 
sentencing. .must be viewed differently. 
At the sentencing phase of trial, the jury 
must not be influenced by any arbitrary 
factors. A prosecutor may not incite the 
passions of a jury when a person's life hangs 
in the balance. Brooks v. Francis, 716 
F. 2d 7 8 0 (11th cir. I -pfa""T)-at-288-:-----
At trial, defendant did not testify either during the 
guilt phase or in the penalty phase. This was a permissible 
tactical choice. (United States v. Gibson, 536 F.2d 1110 (5th 
Circuit, 1976)) 
To nullify defendant's tactical decisions by means 
of fundamental error of constitutional magnitude specifically 
designed to influence the jury to return a verdict of death and 
to seek the death penalty on the basis the defendant has not 
stepped forward and testified to express his remorse or 
willingness to abide by the laws of society, is such fumdamental 
error that the penalty proceedings must be set aside. The 
overwhelming weight of authority requires reversal of the penalty 
and further proceedings or the imposition of a life sentence. 
To allow comments on appellant's silence, however 
subtle, to infect the guilt determination proceedings in a 
capital case likewise is such fundamental error that those 
proceedings must also be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceeding. 
II 
COMMENTS DURING SUMMATION WERE IMPROPER 
AND, IN SUM, REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
A number of assertions were made throughout arguments 
during the guilt and penalty phases of trial which cumulatively 
warrant reversal, especially when viewed in light of the comments 
discussed at Part I of this brief relative to appellant's failure 
to testify. Although the clairevoyance of hindsight may tend 
to elevate the impact of isolated comments, appellant submits 
that the cumulative effect of the below-quoted comments 
impermissibly injected a fervor and passion into the process 
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sufficient to sway the jury into returning the sentence of 
death. Such comments include, in addition to the comments 
treated elsewhere, the following: 
And I consider it significant that the 
police from Bountiful who testified on the 
stand were getting between ten and fifteen 
reports of incidences daily from the 
Gronemans during 1982. Tr. 1/14 at 
97. 
Not only is the factual content patently erroneous 
(cf. Tr. 1/10, 79-83), the comment also interjects the personal 
opinion of the prosecutor. In State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 
(Utah, 1983), this Court stated, though dictum, that statements 
evincing the prosecutor's personal opinion and references to 
improper factors would have required reversal had the Court not 
already found independent grounds to reverse the conviction. 
Personal opinions of the prosecutor generally have been held 
to constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Bowder v. State, 
639 P.2d 889 (Wyo., 1982), and cases cited therein. 
At Tr. 1/14, 106: 
I kind of would like to wonder what 
would happen, for instance, if the Mormon 
Tabernacle Choir observed the whole killing, 
how would Mr. Barber attempt to discredit 
them? Think about that one. 
Besides interjecting personal opinions and beliefs 
supra), this comment further appeals to 
the religious feelings of the jury. Convictions should not be 
obtained by inciting passions or prejudices of the jury. (State 
513 P. 2d 422 (Utah, 1973), and State v. Creviston, 
646 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1982)) 
During penalty phase, Tr. 1/20 at 83: 
If you are cowards and you must say 
to yourselves, "The law has no meaning and 
we can randomly go about intentionally, 
knowingly killing people," and that is the 
signal you will portray unless you find the 
appropriate sentence in this case. 
This comment was a pure and simple appeal to jury 
passion, closely analogous to young lads at play using the 
derisive "chicken!" call to initiate a particularly daring or 
dangerous youthful stunt. 
Also during penalty phase, Tr. 1/20 at 84: 
.but if I have conveyed to you any 
meaning other than the most serious and 
solemn of duties to present to you in this 
case, I apologize for that because it's a 
serious and solemn duty and I wouldn't be 
the penal!Y o1-aeatl1under 
circumstances or con9,it.io.ns than 
duties." (Emphasis added.) 
A prosecutor's request for the death penalty predicated 
upon his assertion that he would not seek the same penalty again 
if the jury did not return with a recommendation (under the South 
Carolina system) of death warranted reversal in State v. Plath, 
284 S.E.2d 221 (S.C., 1981). The comment quoted above again 
injected the personal feelings of the prosecuting attorney and 
was designed to have the jury consider matters improperly before 
them. (State v. Johnson, supra) 
The A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice apply to 
prosecution and defendant alike (Sections 5.8 and 7.8, 1st Ed., 
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respectively) and appellant's counsel does not assert defense 
counsel likewise did not make some improper comment or argument 
during this trial. Feelings run high during such cases, but 
as professionals, those personal feelings have no place in 
counsel's demeanor or speech; nor should personal feelings and 
passions influence the trial and penalty of any criminal case. 
A capital case deserves more. Both the guilt phase and penalty 
phase were tainted and therefore should both be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
III 
EXCLUSION OF POLYGRAPH OPINION EVIDENCE 
WAS A DENIAL OF "DUE PROCESS". 
Appellant filed a motion in limine requesting the 
evidentiary admission of expert testimony concerning the 
foundation of polygraphs and the results of a polygraph performed 
upon the State's critical witness, Carla Sagars, by Sergeant 
Kenneth Thirsk of the Salt Lake City Police Department. (Record 
at 89) 
Appellant also filed a separate motion to permit the 
introduction of such polygraph evidence during the penalty 
phase. (Record at 281) Both requests were denied although the 
Lrial court permitted defense counsel to call and examine 
Sergeant Thirsk concerning statements made by Carla Sagars during 
the particular polygraph examination which occurred only two 
days before trial. (Tr. 1/12, 1013-135) The Court requircJ 
counsel to abstain from any mention of polygraph or the fact 
Ms. Sagars was shown deceptive. (.!5:!. lOJ-107) 
The jury was later excused to permit appellant to make 
a proffer relative to the polygraph test in question and further 
to permit laying a foundation evidence. (Tr. 1/13, 1-122) 
A. EXCLUSION OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE DURING 
THE GUILT PHASE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
The trial court was of the opinion that absent express 
authorization from this court, polygraph results were 
inadmissible. (Tr. 1/3, 119) Appellant contends the Rules of 
Evidence (hereafter U.R.E.} and case law both permit the 
introduction of properly founded expert opinions and polygraph 
results. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence at time of trial provided 
as follows: 
When a person's character or 
a trait of his character is in issue, it 
may be proved by testimony in the form of 
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence 
of specific instances of the person's 
conduct, subject, however, to the limitations 
of Rules 47 and 48. 
Rule 47. Subject to Rule 48, when a trait 
OTa---Person's character is relevant as 
tending to prove his conduct on a specified 
occasion, such trait may be proved in the 
same manner as provided by Rule 46, except 
that (a} evidence of specific instances of 
conduct other than evidence of conviction 
of a crime which tends to prove the trait 
below: 
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to be bad shall be inadmissible, and (b) 
in a criminal action evidence of a triat 
of an accused's character as tending to prove 
his guilt or innocence of the offense 
charged, (i) may not be excluded by the judge 
under Rule 45 if offered by the accused to 
prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered 
by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may 
be admitted only after the accused has 
introduced evidence of his good character. 
Rule 48. Evidence of a trait of a person's 
character with to care or skill is 
inadmissible as tending to prove the quality 
on a specified occasion. 
Opinion testimony is also governed by Rule 56 set forth 
(1) If the witnesss is not testifying 
as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinion or inferences is limited to such 
opinions or inferences as the judge finds 
(a) may be rationally based on the perception 
of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or to the 
determination of the fact in issue. 
(2) If the witness is testifying as 
an expert, testimony of the witness in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited 
to such opinions as the judge finds are (a) 
based on facts or data perceived by or 
personally known or made known to the witness 
at the hearing ad (b) within the scope of 
the special knowledge, skill, experience 
or training possessed by the witness. 
(3) Unless the judge excludes the 
testimony he shall be deemed to have made 
the finding requisite to its admission. 
(4) Testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences otherwise admissible under 
these rules is not objectionable because 
it embraces the ultimate issue or issues 
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to be decided by the trier of tlie fact. 
and Rule 58, also reproduced below: 
Questions calling for the opinion of 
an expert witness need not be hypothetical 
in form unless the judge in his discretion 
so requires, but the witness may state his 
opinion and reasons therefor without first 
specifying data on which it is based as an 
hypothesis or otherwise; but upon 
cross-examination he may be required to 
specify such data. 
The general gist and intent of the foregoing rules 
was not substantially modified with the September 1, 1983, 
adoption of new rules of evidence. 
Stipulations concerning the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence result in treatment as any other evidence. See e.g., 
State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 1232 (Utah, 1974). Also, in State 
v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah, 1983), a bench trial in which 
polygraph results were admitted over the State's objection but 
not cross-appealed, the Court noted that weight and credibility 
of polygraph results are for the finder of fact. 551) 
Admissibility of the polygraph was not in issue. 
With respect of case law at time of trial, the 
companion cases of 600 P.2d 994 (Utah, 1979), 
and State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980), both raised 
the admissibility issue betore this court and both were found 
deficient with respect to the evidentiary record regarding 
foundation. In involving a polygraph given the 
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de(enJant concurring the victim's consent, this court held: 
This brings us to the third point. 
A large number of states have ruled upon 
the admissibility of lie detector tests, 
and most of them have excluded those tests 
from evidence, at least in the absence of 
a stipulation. This does not, of course, 
foreclose this Court from reassessing the 
question of reliability and admissibility 
of the test. It may well be that recent 
developments in this area of endeavor, as 
argued by the State, have progressed to the 
point where polygraph tests should be held 
admissible irrespective of a stipulation. 
But in this particular case, we do not find 
a sufficient foundation in either the briefs 
or the testimony in the trial court for 
assessing the reliability and probative value 
of a polygraph examinaton given the alleged 
perpetrator of the crime to determine the 
issue of an alleged rape victim's consent. 
600 P.2d at 998 
supra, also involved a polygraph test 
administered upon with respect to the victim's 
consent. There was a similar evidentiary deficiency in the 
record with respect to foundation, and consequently, 
defendant-appellant's claim of improper exclusion of polygraph 
results was denied. The Court tendered guidance to those "in 
the trenches" seeking to lay a proper foundation for review of 
admissibility issues. At 612 P.2d 778, the Court suggested the 
expert testify concerning the following factors: 
(1) validity of underlying theory; 
(2) practical application of theory to fabrication 
detection; 
(3) verifiability; and 
(4) successful deception by subject. 
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Using the dictum of counsel proffered the 
testimony of Sergeant Thirsk and Dr. John Kircher, M.S., Ph.D, 
to establish the test results and foundation for admission. 
Dr. Kircher, employed at the University of Utah in 
the Department of Psychology with a speciality in experimental 
psychology (Defendant's Exhibit 46), testified to the basic 
polygraph test theory (Tr. 1/13, 6-9); the validity of the theory 
in field studies and laboratory studies indicating a 90-95% 
accuracy (Id. 9-11); to the practical application of the theory 
to deception detection (_!_S!. 11-13 and 14-24); and the 
likelihood of successful deception of the examiner by a deceptive 
person. (Id. 47-48, 55-77) 
Kenneth Thirsk testified that as an experienced, 
licensed polygraph examiner, he conducted a polygraph examination 
of Carla Sagars on January 3, 1983, free of any threat or 
hypnosis, expecting the test to run smoothly with a positive 
result (_!_S!. 80-84) When posed the relevant questions "At 
the exact instant any of the blows were stuck, were you holding 
the weapon?" and "Was the weapon ever in your possession when 
Mark was struck with it?", Carla Sagars denied the questions; but 
analysis of the polygraph tracings by Sergeant Thirsk and three 
other State employees clearly indicated deception. (Id. 80-91) 
In order to illustrate the adequacy of defendant's 
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I'' offer (which naturally is substantially limited in detail and 
depth and seeks merely to state the general nature of the 
testimony sought to be admitted; see Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Evidence in effect at trial, now denoted Rule 103), this portion 
of the brief will address the nature of the proffered testimony 
with respect to each of the four foundational criteria suggested 
by this court in Collins: 
(1) Validity of underlying 
theory 
(2) Practical application of 
theory to fabrication 
detection 
(3) Verifiability 
Control question techniques 
have been validated in both 
field studies and laboratory 
studies which indicate a 90-
95% validity. (Tr. 1/13 at 
6-13) 
Measurement of physiological 
activity (Id. 11-13) is 
compared numerically (Id. 
15-17) and a correlation co-
efficient of .97 indicating 
sound practical application. 
(Id. 18-19) 
Control questions are dis-
cussed beforehand to avoid 
surprise and its reaction. 
(Id. 63) Such occurred 
i"il""this case. (Id. 85) 
Numerical techniques have 
a correlation co-efficient 
of .97 (Id. 18-19) and other 
studies have discounted the 
friendly polygraph hypothesis. 
(Id. 61-62) 
The instant polygraph charts 
were blind scored by three 
other examiners, all of whom 
were enforcement related. 
(Id. 86, 90, admitted 
eXFiibits at 91) Scoring 
showed deception. (Id. 
90-91) 
(4) Successful Deception Studies have been directed 
at false negative error which 
is not applicable to this 
case. (Id. 14 and 
especially 47-48) There 
is no evidence to suggest 
a deceptive person can be 
termed truthful. (Id. 
55-56) 
The adequacy of the proffer must be interpreted in 
light of the very limited use sought; i.e., for impeachment 
purposes and to indicate the factual circumstances of Ms. Sagars' 
statement she hit the victim twice. 
Naturally any proffer must pass the muster of (1) 
relevance, (2) competency and (3) policy. See e.g., 
381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass., 1978), for 
application to polygraph evidence. 
(1) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence tending 
to make the existence of any material fact more or less likely. 
(Rule 1(2), U.R.E. (now Rule 401)) If the proffered testimony 
is believed, such testimony undoubtedly is relevant to the 
credibility of the State's main witness. See 
v. Ridling, 350 F.Supp. 90, n. 5 (E.D. Mich., 1972). 
(2) Competent evidence from an expert is defined as 
evidence " .based on facts or data personally known or made 
known to the witness at the hearing and within the scope of the 
special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by 
the witness." (Rule 56(2), U.R.E. (now Rules 702, 703 and 704)) 
Such competency in polygraph admissibility cases was deemed 
lacking as early as 1923 in ££Ye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
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10.c. App.), and a host of decisions annotated at 53 A.L.R.3d 
1005 in which the courts generally held that polygraph theory 
and techniques had not risen to the appropriate level of 
acceptance within the scientific community. That view 
essentially ignored the basic tenet that the jury is the 
exclusive judge of credibility of any and all witnesses. 
(Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; State 
supra, and authorities cited at n. 7 on 1234, and 
State v. Tanner, supra.) Most trial practitioners are aware 
of the "stock" expert witness credibility instruction to the 
effect that the jury can choose to believe or disbelieve any 
expert witness. See e.g., DeVitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury 
Practice and Instructions, Section 15.22 (3rd Ed., 1977). 
Distinction between judicial notice of scientific facts 
and the admissibility of scientific evidence must be carefully 
maintained. 
Appellant's proffer clearly shows that the level of acceptance 
(competency) now has risen to a "demonstrable stage." 
supra) See also State of Utah v. Rebeterano, 
P.2d (Utah, 1984), Case No. 18428, filed April 30, 1984. 
Sergeant Thirsk testified that he had conducted 261 
polygraphs (Tr. 1/13, 82); that he conducted the polygraph 
examinations on Ms. Sagars at the request of the County 
Attorney's office (_!,Q. 119-120); that on prior occasions, 
criminal cases were dismissed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office on the basis of a polygraph alone l.!.E.· 112-113); and 
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that blind scoring of the Sergeant Th1rsk polygraph machine 
tracings by two other police officers and an employee of Adult 
Probation and Parole all scored Ms. Sagars deceptive. 
Dr. Kircher testified that his doctoral degree was 
in the sub-specialty of experimental psychology and had the 
qualifications, education and publications reflected in his 
vitae, Defense Exhibit 46. He recited the field and laboratory 
studies achieving a reliability and accuracy in the order of 
90% or more 1/13, 5-11), and firmly stated that sound 
scientific research produced no evidence whatsoever that a 
deceptive person could defeat the test. (Id. 55) 
The State offered no evidence or witness to refute 
plaintiff's proffer of scientific acceptance. The State chose 
simply to question witnesses about possible biases, knowledge 
of quoted passages contained in various publications and 
hypothetical questions. 
Absent evidence to the contrary, plaintiff's 
evidentiary proffer must be taKen as true unless it is so 
inherently improbable judicial notice can be taken of its 
improbability. Furthermore, a ". .failure to achieve the 
standard of general acceptance need not freeze the evidentiary 
development of the polygraph in view of its unique potential 
as a tool of justice." (Vitello, supra at 592) 
(3) Policy considerations or other exclusionary rules 
may limit otherwise relevant evidence. (See Rule 7, U.R.E. 
(current Rules 402 and 702).) The age-old "confusion and 
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1
,teJudice to the jury" consideration has oft-times been cited 
a policy supporting polygraph exclusion. 
2nd Ed. 1972 at 491) Such was the trial court's 
opinion. (Tr. 1/13, 119-120) The weakness of an exclusion based 
on that notion is amply demonstrated by the admissibility of 
opinion evidence in the following areas: ballistics, 
fingerprints, radar guns, breathalizer, intoxilizer, paternity 
based on blood analysis, arson or fire investigations, insanity 
based on mental defect, voice analysis for identification, hair 
sample analysis or battered child syndrome. This list certainly 
is not exhaustive and pointedly has failed to include character 
evidence admitted under federal and state rules for many years. 
See e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence 608, 1983, and Utah Rules 
of Evidence 608, formerly U.R.E. 46-47. As noted by the Court 
in supra, ". .fitting in the polygraph opinion will 
require no alteration of these [character opinion] rules." (350 
F.Supp. at 96) 
Opponents to the admission of opinion evidence based 
upon polygraph examination have claimed such opinion invades 
the province of the jury. Such ignores the traditional role 
of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact and presupposes the 
jury will place undue weight on such opinion evidence 
notwithstanding court instructions. Such also ignores the 
traditional cleansing role of cross-examination and expert 
testimony of opposing parties. This court so held in State 
v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 123 (Utah, 1974), stating: 
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When this evidence was received, it 
had the same status as any other evidence; 
that is, it was to be considered by the jury 
in connection with all of the other evidence 
in the case; and it was their prerogative 
to give it whatever credibility they thought 
it was entitled to. (See Section 77-24-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
Chadwick, 25 P. 737, 7 Utah 134; and State 
v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 22 U.2d 27.) -----rd:" 
at-1234:- --
The Court in was a little more expansive, 
although supportive of the position stated by this Court, 
reasoning in the following manner: 
The argument that the jury will be 
displaced by a machine or by a polygraph 
examiner lacks merit. The jury will make 
the final determinaton of guilt or 
innocence. In this connection it is 
important to understand how different juries 
are today than they were when the restrictive 
rules of evidence were first developed. 
On the whole they read widely. Largely 
because of television they know generally 
what is going on in the world. Their 
educational background is extensive. They 
think. They reason. They are really very 
good at sorting out good evidence from bad, 
of separating the credible witness from the 
incredible, and of disregarding experts who 
attempt to inject their opinions into areas 
of which they have little knowledge. They 
would welcome all evidence having a bearing 
on the problem they are deciding and the 
give and take of deliberation would expose 
weaknesses in any witness or evidence. A 
modern jury, that must deliberate, and must 
agree, is the ideal body to evaluate opinions 
of this kind. The search for truth should 
be enhanced, eliminating some cases in which 
both sides agree there is no real issue, 
and in other cases assisting the jury to 
reach a just result. supra, at 
98. 
More recently this Court in supra, 
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,e1terated the evidentiary impact of polygraph evidence, stating: 
The defendant claims that the favorable 
results of the polygraph test that she took 
automatically raise a reasonable doubt as 
to her guilt. We do not agree. The court 
was not obligated to give more weight to 
that evidence than to other evidence 
presented. The weight and credibility given 
the evidence is decided by the finder of 
fact, in this case, the court. The court 
did not err in basing its conclusions on 
the other evidence before it. We do not 
hold that a favorable polygraph test raises 
a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. 
Id. at 551. 
A thirdly-stated policy opposing admissibility of 
polygraph-based opinion evidence is one decrying the consumption 
of time at trial. To say such is even a valid policy 
consideration in a death penalty case borders on the ludicrous, 
and to decry trial time in a death penalty case involving 
relatively few witnesses and court time (approximately 11 trial 
days all told) probably creeps across the threshold. The Court 
will not relinquish power to control scope of examination and 
cross-examination of experts by virtue of admitting polygraph 
based opinion evidence. The proffer in the case at bar consumed 
less than one day, although admittedly the proffer and 
cross-examination was less extensive than rationally expected 
had the jury been present. 
Other policy considerations supporting admissibility 
may be loosely grouped to include (a) right of confrontation, 
lb) untrammeled right to produce exculpatory evidence, (c) 
latitude in impeachment or cross-examination, (d) widespread 
4b 
reliance of such opinion by law enforcement, (e) exercise ot 
prosecutorial discretion based on polygraph opinion, (f) 
irrevocability of the death penalty allowing greater latitude 
and (g} greater need in a single eyewitness prosecution. These 
are treated below. 
(a) The right of confrontation is the mainstay of 
our criminal process. Guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the right of confrontation includes the 
right to cross-examination. 380 U.S. 400, 
13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 s.ct. 1065 (1963)) 
In Smith v. Illinois, 300 U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 
88 S.Ct. 748 (1968), the trial court erronesouly limited 
defendant's cross-examination of the principal witness in a trial 
which had as its sole issue the credibility of the prosecution 
witness. When credibility of one witness is the sole issue, 
.prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place 
the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his 
testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury 
cannot fairly appraise them ...• " (390 U.S. at 132, 19 L.Ed.2d 
at 959 quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 75 L.Ed. 
624, 51 S.Ct. 218 (1931)) See also 743 
F.2d 458 (7th Cir., 1981), involving a polygraph in a 
"stipulation" state, n. 6 at 461. 
Appellant was similarly situated as supra, 
in that the Court made it abundantly clear on the record and 
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"ff the record that polygraph would not be mentioned in front 
of the jury. Effective cross-examination of Ms. Sagars was 
precluded in that the setting, motivations and nature of her 
statements could not be properly demonstrated. In fact, in 
cross-examinating Sergeant Thirsk, the prosecutor elicited 
responses indicative of prior consistent statements made by Ms. 
Sagars, thereby compounding appellant's denial of effective 
cross-examination or confrontation. (See Tr. 1/12, 123-128.) 
(b) The untrammeled right to produce exculpatory 
evidence in criminal defense should promote caution in limiting 
in any way defendant's attempts to show a lack of culpability. 
In United States v. Hart, 344 F.Supp. 522 (E.O.N.Y., 1971), 
the court followed the lead of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 s.ct. 1194 (1963), and held: 
The results of the tests which the 
government had [the witness] take are 
admissible on behalf of the defendant because 
the government initially thought they were 
reliable enough to assist it in evaluating 
its witness. 344 F.Supp. at 524. 
(c) The policy of allowing wide latitude in 
cross-examinations also supports the notion that proper areas 
of inquiry may range far and wide in showing the bias, 
motivations, character or honesty of a witness. Relevancy 
parameters should be the only restriction. 
(d) Today's policy of widespread use of polygraphs 
in law enforcement is further supportive of impeachment evidence 
admissibility. Evidence during appellant's proffer indicated 
that the Salt Lake City Police Department employed at least three 
polygraph examiners (Tr. 1/13, 86-91), and the County Attorney's 
office at least one, Steve Bartlett, named but not called by 
the State. Adult Probation and Parole also employs at least 
one polygraph examiner. (Ibid.) Presumably decisions in the 
law enforcement field are based, at least in part, upon the 
opinions of such polygraph examiners. 
(e) The practice and policy of basing prosecutorial 
decisions upon the results of polygraph examinations is well 
known and supported in the record at Tr. 1/13, 111-113. See 
also Bailey and Rothblatt, Investigation and Preparation of 
Criminal Cases Federal and State, (Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1970). 
(f) Death penalty cases have engendered a policy of 
greater caution in limiting evidence. 
442 U.S. 95, 60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150 (1979), the Court 
held that the hearsay rule could not bar evidence tending to 
exculpate defendants in a death penalty case. In 
455 U.S. 104, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869 (1982), 
the Court held that failure to consider defendant's unhappy 
upbringing and emotional disturbance warranted reversal. This 
policy is treated hereafter as a substantive argument. 
(g) The policy in single accomplice-witness cases 
should be one of greater latitude in presenting credibility 
evidence. Until 1980 Utah law prohibited convictions based 
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
(Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (prior 
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1 -, L980)) The 1980 amendment allowed such conviction and permits 
the trial court to give a cautionary instruction. That 
cautionary instruction should not ring hollow by excluding 
evidence. (Appellant requested and received such a cautionary 
instruction. Although many facets of Ms. Sagars story were 
corroborated, not one single piece of physical evidence actually 
connected defendant to the scene of the crime.) 
Since defendant proffered relevant scientific evidence 
based upon a recognized, substantive body of knowledge, it was 
error of the trial court to exclude the evidence during the guilt 
phase of the trial. 
B. ANY EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION IS ADMISSIBLE 
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE. 
Appellant moved in writing on January 19, 1983, for 
the admission of polygraph evidence during the penalty phase 
of the trial scheduled to commence on January 20, 1983. Record 
at 281 Although the Court denied the motion, that denial 
apparently was made without the benefit of a clear record, (Tr. 
1/20, 72) but the position of the Court was made abundantly clear 
on the record that, in the trial court's opinion, polygraphs 
had no place in the courtroom. (Tr. 1/13, 119-120) Objection 
was again orally made on February 4, 1983, on the record. (Tr. 
2 , 4' 11) 
Section 76-3-207 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provided for relaxed evidentiary rules during the 
penalty phase of a capital felony, stating: 
(2) In these sentenc1ny rroceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any matter 
the court deems relevant to sentence, 
including but not limited to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental and 
physical condition, and any other facts in 
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. 
of its admissibility under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence. The state's attorney and-the-defendant shall be permitted to 
present argument for or against sentence 
of death. Aggravating circumstances shall 
include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Mitigation circumstances shall include the 
following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant 
history of prior criminal activity. 
* * * 
(g) And any other fact in 
of the penalty. 
Relaxation of evidentiary rules is the crux of 
bifurcated guilt and penalty hearings as a means to avoid 
prejudice in the guilt phase. See 607 P.2d 
261 (Utah, 1980), in which defendant objected to relaxation of 
the evidentiary rules. 
Appellant's motion specifically cited 
supra, in which the death penalty was vacated because 
the trial court had excluded during the penalty phase hearsay 
evidence tending to exculpate defendant. The statement was of 
a third person allegedly confessing to the actual shooting, 
although the petitioner had already been found guilty. The Court 
held: 
,[ 
: t 
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Regardless of whether the proffered 
testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay 
rule, under the facts of this case its 
exclusion constituted a violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. 442 U.S. at 97, 60 L.Ed.2d 
at 741. --
438 U.S. 586, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 
s.Ct. 2954 (1978), decided shortly before supra, 
addressed the nagging question of what facts must be taken into 
account at sentencing in capital cases. The Court held: 
.We conclude that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of 
capital case, not be precluded from 
considering any 
aspect of a defendant's character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for 
a sentence less than death. (Emphasis by 
the Court.) (Footnotes omitted.) 438 U.S. 
at 604, 57 L.Ed.2d at 990. 
The Court decided 438 U.S. 637, 57 
L.Ed.2d 1010, 98 S.Ct. 2977 (1978), the same day as Lockett, 
supra, and similarly concluded the Ohio death penalty statute 
was constitutionally infirm because petitioner had been precluded 
from presenting any factor in mitigation. Ohio's statute 
permitted only three specified factors in mitigation to be 
considered; to wit: (a) victim inducement or facilitation, (b) 
,lefendant' s duress, coercion or strong provocation, and (c) 
mental defects not amounting to insantiy. The statute allowed 
the Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime 
and the defendant. 
The penalty of death was again vacated in 
supra, because the ". .sentence was imposed 
without the type of individualized consideration of mitigating 
factors. .required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
in capital cases." 455 U.S. at 105, 71 L.Ed.2d at 5, 
citing Lockett v. Ohio, supra.) 
Similar to Utah's sentencing statute, the Oklahoma 
(Compare Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated, to Oklahoma 
statute, Title 21, Section 701.10 (1980).) The trial court had 
found the aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and in mitigation considered only defendant's 
youth but refused to consider his turbulent background. The 
Court held that evidence of a violent background was relevant 
and required to be considered stating: 
The sentencer. .may determine the 
weight to be given relevant mitigating 
evidence. But they may not give it no weight 
by excluding such evidence from their 
consideration. 
Footnote: We note that the Oklahoma 
death penalty statute permits defendant to 
present evidence "as to any mitigation 
circumstances." Lockett requires the 
sentencer to listen. (Citation omitted.) 
supra, 455 U.S. at 114-115, 71 
11. 
The case at bar presents a classic 
exclusion of relevant evidence proffered by Tillman in mitigation 
during the penalty phase. The evidence had a tendency to show 
deception by the State's chief witness and tended to support 
appellant's theory of the case to the effect that the evidence 
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c•Juld reasonably infer Ms. Sagars perpetrated the crime. The 
evidence clearly was ". .any other fact in mitigation. 
(Section 76-3-207 (2) (g), Utah Code Annotated) to which the 
sentencer was required to listen. This Court's comments in 
748 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1982), although directed 
at the burden of proof during the penalty phase, still are 
appropriate to the issue at bar: 
Even if Soloman--like wisdom were 
available in framing objective standards, 
their whole purpose could be thwarted if 
the governing procedural rules allowed the 
sentencing body to impose the death penalty 
in the face of evidence which creates a 
reasonable or substantial doubt as to the 
appropriatness of that penalty. Id. at 
81. 
A procedural rule should not thwart Mr. Tillman's 
proffered evidence from reaching the sentencing body. 
Since the jury was not apprised of all relevant 
evidence in mitigation, appellant is entitled, at minimum, to 
a new penalty phase hearing. 
IV 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A MEANINGFUL COMPARISON 
OF A LIFE SENTENCE WITH THE DEATH PENALTY. 
Section 76-3-208 (3), Utah Code Annotated, (Pocket 
',;upplement, 1983), requires the jury, in effect, to compare the 
1 ifc sentence to the death sentence for a particular defendant. 
That section provides: 
(3) The court or jury, as the case 
may be, shall retire to consider the 
penalty. In all proceedings before a jury, 
under this section, it shall be instructed 
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a 
unanimous verdict for death and that to be 
imposed if a unanimous verdict for death 
is not found. If the jury reports unanimous 
agreement to impose the sentence of death, 
the court shall discharge the jury and shall 
impose the sentence of death. If the jury 
is unable to reach a unanimous verdict 
imposing the sentence of death, the court 
shall discharge the jury and impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
During argument, appellant's counsel suggested a life 
sentence for appellant might mean a sentence of some 15 to 20 
years if appellant was ever paroled, which was highly unlikely. 
(Tr. 1/20, 92-93) State's counsel rejoined with, .they 
were rotten and it took them 40 years to purge their souls. 
Forty years, not fifteen years as a life 
mean. 11 ( !2.. 11 2 ) And also, "Can you honestly say to 
yourselves 15 years hence that a person showing the lack of 
remorse Mr. Tillman has shown is going to be a better person 
when he gets out ••. (Id. 116} 
Appellant's counsel attempted to demonstrate society's 
interests would be adequately served with a life sentence and 
State's counsel used the "door" so opened to minimize the meaning 
of a life sentence. The jury was now pointedly asked to compare 
penalties of a different magnitude; to wit: death versus 15 
years! 
With the luxury of hindsight, the foregoing comparsion 
appears as a monstrous error. A life sentence means an 
indeterminate sentence of five years up to life imprisonment. 
(Section 76-3-203(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) 
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rhe Board of Pardons decides the time and conditions for release, 
1 ( any. See generally Chapter 27 of Title 77, Utah Code 
Annotated, (Pocket Supplement as amended in 1983). Presently 
the Utah State Prison houses murderers who have been incarcerated 
for almost 20 years without parole dates. (Messrs. Lance and 
Kelbach come to mind, perhaps others have been incarcerated as 
long.) The Parole Board's obligaton and function is to assess 
the threat to society in determining appropriate parole dates, 
and in certain cases, invite the attendance of victims, their 
families or law enforcement officials. (Section 77-27-3, Utah 
Code Annotated) For the jury to be informed a life sentence 
meant fifteen years caused the penalty of death to become more 
likely. Had the jury been instructed a life sentence in a 
capital case meant an actual sentence for life for this 
particular defendant, or that appellant would not be released, 
if at all, unless an independent board designed to expertly rule 
on such matters concluded society would not be threatened by 
such release, the outcome may have been different. 
Reasonable minds obviously would view the balancing 
process undertaken by this jury for some seven hours as being 
substantially influenced by a more accurate definition of a life 
sentence under Utah law. Defendant-appellant should have 
the benefit of all favorable facts and inferences 
tending to influence the finder of fact. (See cases cited in 
Section III B, infra, re admissibility of polygraph results at 
penalty phase.) 
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Although obJection was riot concurrently made, appellant 
moved for a new trial on the gLounds the jury could not 
rationally compare the death penalty to a life sentence when 
the life sentence was undefined. (Tr. 2/4 at 8 and Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment, Record at 357-358.) Even though objection 
is not technically preserved, this Court has reviewed the record 
for error in a capital case. 648 P.2d 71 
(Utah, 1982)) Review for possible error, even though not raised 
on appeal or argued, may be undertaken by the Court sua 
3 U.2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 at 
327 (1955) and 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 
(1931)) 
The impermissible shift from "life" to fifteen years 
modified and effected the penalty choice submitted to the jury 
and therefore entitles appellant to an order remanding the case 
for new penalty phase proceedings. 
v 
THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE 
CRIME, THE IMMUNITY GRANTED THE ACCOMPLICE AND 
THE SENTENCES METED OUT IN SIMILAR CASES. 
A. The victim received 
a number of blows to the head and died of asphyxiation due to 
a fire. The blows probably would have been fatal. (Tr. 1/4, 
134-136) The victim was rendered unconscious by the first blow. 
(Tr. 1/6, 308-310) 
It is this court's professed duty to determine whether 
the sentence of death is disproportionate to the crime. 
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648 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1982) at 77 and 80 citing State 
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah, 1977)) In Wood, this court 
held, inter alia, that the lack of constitutional limitations 
upon the aggravating circumstances flawed the sentencing 
procedure. (648 P.2d at 85-86) The Court stated that " ••• 
under Utah law, 'ruthlessness and brutality,' as an agravating 
factor, must be limited to those murders involving an aggravated 
battery or torture." (Citing State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343 
(Utah, 1977)) (.!__<:]_. 8 6) This holding resulted from the 
application of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 64 L.Ed.2d 
398, 100 s.ct. 1759 (1980), cited in Wood, supra. 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that 
the Eighth Amendment did not invariably require a se 
comparative proportionality although statutory schemes which 
require comparative proportionality review have received 
constitutional approval. U.S. 
7 9 L • Ed . 2 d 2 9 , l 0 4 s • ct • 3 4 c r . L • Rp tr • 3 0 2 7 ( 19 8 4) ) 
However, "proportionality" in the traditional sense (i.e., 
gravity of offense and severity of penalty, sentences for other 
crimes and sentencing practices in other jurisdictions) is still 
the guiding standard in interpreting the "cruel and unusual" 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
at 35) 
(Id. 79 L.Ed.2d 
Section 76-1-104, Utah Code Annotated, applies 
principles of construction to the Code and specifically provides 
for proportionate sentencing. It states: 
76-1-104. Purposes and principles of 
construction. The provisions of this code 
shall be construed in accordance with these 
general purposes. 
(]) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental 
state which constitute each offense and 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from 
condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses 
and which permit recognition or differences 
in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders. 
(4) Prevent aribtrary or oppressive treatment 
of persons accused or convicted of offenses. 
Section 76-3-206, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, requires "automatic review" of all death sentences. 
Such review had been interpreted to include traditional 
proportionality review, supra; 
Andrews, 574 P.2d 209, (1977). 
This court in 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), applied 
proportionality review stating: 
The circumstances of the offenses and 
the defendant's participation in them. • we 
believe, created 
We therefore 
reject this argument of disproportionality 
as inconsistent with the obvious facts. 
(Emphasis added) Id. at 1355. 
The above-stated conclusion is a profound 
understatement of the events recounted by a survivor of that 
tragedy. In comparison appellant Tillman's conduct in this crime 
as recounted by Carla Sagars simply cannot be equated to the 
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"cruelty, terror and atrocity" cited above. Appellant's conduct 
did not rise to the level of ". .extreme and unusually serious 
crimes. (emphasis added) (Id. 1356) required 
before imposition of the ultimate sanction. The men in Utah 
currently under a sentence of death (excluding appellant) consist 
of individuals who have committed multiple homicides of almost 
incredible magnitude, the gruesome details of which this court 
and the general public have been informed by the news media and 
appellate review. Without reviewing the undisputed facts of 
those cases, (one of which has yet to be reviewed by this court), 
it can be concluded that appellant's crime is unextraordinary 
and that appellant's sentence of death is disproportionate, 
factually and legally, to the crime. There was no torture nor 
extended personal confrontation. The initial assault resulted 
in unconsciousness and death followed shortly thereafter. No 
other victims were directly involved. 
B. to Accomplice Sentence. Carla 
Sagars testified she stalked the victim, provided information, 
purchased guns, plotted various impossible schemes, committed 
a n11mber of felonies while employed at the U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons, aided and abetted the actual homicide by personal 
participation and received complete and full immunity although 
sne had already voluntarily confessed to her complicity in the 
offense. (See generally Tr. 1/6, 191 to Tr. 1/7, 512, 
inclusive.) 
Proportionality review in other jurisdictions have 
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included comparison to accompl1ce sentences. See e.g., People 
.Y.!._Q.!.1:1:2.!!• 34 Cal.3d 441, 668 P.2d 697 (1983), 
, 3 3 9 So . 2 d 18 6 ( F 1 a . , 1 9 7 6 ) , c e r t . den . 4 3 9 U • S . 9 9 1 
(1978), wherein that court compared the life sentence imposed 
upon the accomplice with the death sentence of appellant who 
was the dominating figure in the felony-murder, stating: 
We are extremely sensitive to the 
demands of equality before the law in cases 
in which we must consider whether a sentence 
of death should be upheld. Our reading of 
408 U.S. 238 (1972), 
.convinces us that identical crimes 
committed by people with similar criminal 
histories require identical sentences. 
Id. at 192. 
Appellant in the case at bar does not argue Ms. Sagars 
should be given the death penalty--there are obvious differences 
in circumstances, history and claimed complicity--however, 
appellant strenuously urges this court to compare the incredibly 
diverse treatment of the two parties to the crime. 
The prevalent practice in modern criminal prosecutions 
involves wide-spread use of "snitches" or immunized witnesses. 
This practice, coupled with repeal of the Accomplice 
Corroboration Rule (Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended in 1980) certainly has facilitated criminal prosecutions, 
but by the same token has heightened the potential for abuse 
in the "race to the courthouse." The first one of multiple 
co-defendants to "confess" and blame the others from the witness 
stand generally emerges unscathed, victorious (in terms of 
freedom, fees, new job or identity, lesser criminal record) and, 
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1,.)t incidentally, typically immune from being shown deceptive 
with respect to the details of the crime itself or the 
comparative complicity of the slower-footed defendant at trial. 
The case at bar typifies the extreme result of the confessor 
to a homicide avoiding all sanctions and the non-confessor 
receiving the sanction. The disproportionate 
treatment between the two participants is the product of 
arbitrariness and caprice-procribed in Fuhrman v. Georgia, 
408 u.s. 238 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 s.ct. 2726 (1972), and prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 9, Utah Constitution. The Court should vacate 
the penalty of death as patently disproportionate to the full 
immunity granted the accomplice. 
C. of Sentence to Similar Cases. 
(Comparative proportionality.) Defendant attempted to introduce 
affidavit evidence during the penalty phase to the effect that 
a number of previously-tried capital homicide cases in Salt Lake 
County resulted in life sentences. The motions and affidavits 
are at pages 289-332 of the record on appeal. The Court barred 
introduction of the evidence before the jury but permitted the 
same to be filed as part of the court record. (Tr. 1/20, 72) 
This Court has previously ruled the automatic review 
of capital cases includes review of proportionality of the 
sentence. (Subsection A, supra, and cases there cited) Although 
comparative proportionality review is not mandated by Federal 
Constitutional Standards, the practice has been lauded and 
occassionally applied. 
cited) This Court has not specifically ruled that comparative 
proportionality review is to be performed; however, it has stated 
that: 
.we believe that this state's system 
meets the constitutional tests because it 
is structured to provide reasonably that 
the unique and irretrievable sanction of 
death will be mandated by its provisions 
and processes only in extreme and unusually 
serious and shocking crimes. State 
v. Pierre, supra, 572 P.2d at 1356. 
Subsequently, in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah, 1980) 
and Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah, 1980) this Court 
held that comparative review could not be raised in a subsequent 
Rule 65 B(i), U.R.C.P., proceeding because such review was deemed 
a matter of law and Utah's statute was constitutional "on its 
face." 814) In Andrews v. Morris, supra, this Court 
adopted the rationale of Spinkellink v. 578 F.2d 
582 (5th Cir., 1978), cert. den., 440 U.S. 976 (1979), which 
prohibited comparison of every decision, trial, juror, 
prosecutor, etc. 
Appellant does not request comparative proportionality 
review in the manner rejected in supra, 
but he reasonably and simply asserts that comparison of his case 
to the death penalty cases Qf without more would 
clearly demonstrate other crimes much more vicious, inhumane 
or reprehensible and that appellant's crime more nearly parallels 
the crimes of those not given the death penalty. Section 
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/b-1-104(3) and (4), Utah Code Annotated, mandates such 
comparison. 
Appellant further asserts the trial court erred in 
excluding the affidavits proffered by defendant. The affidavits 
would have allowed the jury to compare sentences in a more 
informed manner. That is, the jury could then decide whether 
the crime in question was an ". .extreme and unusually serious 
and shocking. ." crime. Extreme compared to what? Unusual 
compared to the "usual"? 
Prohibition of the factual comparison denied Mr. 
Tillman the right to present "any evidence in mitigation" 
mandated by Section 76-3-207 of the Utah Code and the right to 
due process of law. Prohibition of a factual comparison 
eradicates the mechanism which would insure that " ••• the law 
.[is] applied, in all cases, in a judicious and even-handed 
manner." (State v. wood, supra, 648 P.2d at BO; The sentence 
in this case cannot be considered "even-handed" when compared 
to sentences imposed in cases addressed by the affidavits on 
file herein, including State v. Hansen, (one homicide perhaps 
torture, another homicide attempted, disfigurement, etc.); State 
(same as Hansen); (multiple 
nornicide of prominent businessman and his wife under numerous 
hJgravating circumstances by youthful defendant); 
(drug store proprietor murdered during a robbery in 
front of two witnesses, defendant on parole) 
(homicide to prevent identification by an unresisting 
cab driver, defendant notched gun and bragged about deed); State 
v. Franklin, (multiple homicide of two black joggers for racial 
motives, prior felonies by defendant); 
(machine-gun killing of a witness during an aggravated kidnapping 
- no criminal history, no torture, possible emotional 
imbalance); State v. Stark, (the killing of a state trooper 
by an 18-year old parolee); State v. Kanusky, (involved a 
torture killing by a defendant with a criminal history). On 
the other side of the coin, death sentences were imposed in 
supra, supra, and CR-83-1314, 
Salt Lake County District Court, all alleging multiple 
homicides. The cases of supra, and supra, 
had the penalty of death vacated. 
The sentence of death in this particular case is 
disproportionate to the unextraordinary crime of which appellant 
stands convicted. The sentence of death is arbitrary, 
capricious, and therefore disproportionate to the distinctly 
cavalier treatment of the accomplice. The sentence of death 
in this case is freakish and disproportionate to the sentences 
of other individuals convicted of multiple killings, torture 
killings or other cruel homicides and fails to equate to those 
sentenced to death in Utah for multiple and atrocious killings. 
This Court should vacate the death penalty and remand for 
imposition of a life sentence. 
65 
VI 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS INFIRM BECAUSE IT 
IS BASED ON A DUPLICITOUS INFORMATION. 
The Information charged appellant with Murder in the 
First Degree, a Capital Offense based upon the felony-murder 
rule. (Record at 17) At preliminary hearing the Information 
was amended to allege the underlying felonies of burglary, 
aggravated burglary or arson or aggravated arson (Record at 17), 
thereby permitting the jury to find guilt and/or impose the 
sentence of death upon two classifications of felonies. 
Appellant complained of such duplicity in his motion in arrest 
of judgment filed January 28, 1983. (Record at 34) The Motion 
was argued on February 4, 1983, (Tr. 2/4, 5-8) and denied. 
(Id. 21) 
Appellant also submitted jury instruction in which 
the felony-murder rule theory was expressed only in terms of 
burglary or aggravated burglary. (Record at 156, Cf. 157) The 
Court may take notice of an error even though lacking formal 
exception to jury instruction. See State v. Dubois, 98 P.2d 
354 (Utah, 1940); State v. Peterson, 240 P.2d 504 (Utah, 1952). 
In 574 P.2d 709 (Utah, 1977), the 
Court addressed issues even though not raised on appeal of a 
capital case. 710) When fundamental rights are involved, 
a mere failure to object does not bar standing. 
616 P.2d 628 (Wash., 1980)) 
The law relative to duplicity may be summarized by 
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quoting the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Starks, 
515 F.2d 112 (1975) at 116-117: 
Duplicity is the joining in a single 
count of two or more distinct and separate 
offenses. One vice of duplicity is that 
a general verdict for a defendant on that 
count does not reveal whether the jury found 
him not guilty of one crime or not guilty 
of both. Conceivably, this could prejudice 
the defendant in protecting himself against 
double jeopardy. Another vice of duplicity 
is that a general verdict of guilty does 
not disclose whether the jury found the 
defendant guilty of one crime or of both. 
Conceivably, this could prejudice the 
defendant in sentencing and in obtaining 
appellate review. A third vice of duplicity 
is that it may prejudice the defendant with 
respect to evidentiary rulings during the 
trial, since evidence admissible on one 
offense might be inadmissible on the other. 
Joining conspiracy and substantive offenses 
in the same count present this vice in a 
particularly aggravated form, because of 
the admissibility of declarations made by 
co-conspirators. Assuming such a joinder, 
and a general guilty verdict, there would 
ordinarily be no way of discerning whether 
the jury found the defendant guilty of the 
offense in proof of which such 
co-conspirator's admissions were properly 
admitted. Finally, there is no way of 
knowing with a general verdict on two 
separate offenses joined in a single count 
whether the jury was unanimous with respect 
to either. (515 F.2d at 116-117) 
In the defendants therein were charged with 
conspiracy and attempt to violate the Hobbs Act (18 u.s.c.A. 
Section 1951) through acts of robbery and extortion. The Court 
overturned the conviction because of duplicity. 
A general verdict predicated upon two alternative 
grounds must be set aside if one of the grounds is infirm. 
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In v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 
512, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 484 (1931), a communist was 
convicted of violating a flag statute which had three 
definitional clauses, one of which was held unconstitutional. 
Since the general verdict could have been predicated on the 
unconstitutional portion of the statute, the verdict was vacated. 
In accord is Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 
77 s.ct. 1064, l L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), another communist party 
case in which the Court followed the rule of Stromberg, supra, 
stating: 
.we think the proper rule to be 
applied is that which requires a verdict 
to be set aside in cases where the verdict 
is supportable on one ground, but not on 
another, and it is impossible to tell which 
ground the jury selected. (Citation 
omitted.) 354 U.S. at 311, l L.Ed.2d at 1371. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the application of the Stromberg rule to sentencing procedures 
in a death penalty case. In Zant v. Stephens, U.S. 
103 S.Ct. , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), Stephens, the respondent, 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after the Georgia 
jury had found the existence of two (or perhaps three by 
inference) statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which 
was later held invalid. Although the conviction was affirmed 
on a harmless-error rule application, the Court reaffirmed the 
viability of and specifically noted that a different 
result might be obtained when the penalty phase requires the 
finder of fact to weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
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circumstances. u. s. 77 L.Ed.2d at 258 (advance 
sheets)) Utah law requires such "weighing" procedures. (State 
v. Wood, supra) 
The case at bar is fundamentally identical with 
v. Green, supra, in which the defendant allegedly murdered a 
rape-kidnapping victim. The felony-murder rule was invoked based 
on either a rape or a kidnapping. On appeal, the Court held 
that there was insufficient evidence of kidnapping; and inasmuch 
as it was " .impossible for us to know if the jury was 
unanimous in determining whether aggravated first degree murder 
was committed in the furtherance of kidnapping or rape. 
(emphasis by the court) 631), the case was reversed and 
remanded. The jury had been instructed that they could find 
first degree murder if the homicide was in furtherance of a rape 
or a kidnapping, without requiring the jury to specify which 
alternate ground or both grounds were the underlying felony. 
Upon a second review, the Court concluded that kidnapping had 
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that therefore 
the required unanimity was lacking. Some jurors could have 
relied upon the kidnapping and others relied on the rape to 
conclude guilt of felony-murder. 
The case at bar is strikingly similar to 
Green, supra. Appellant herein was convicted of felony-murder 
under two distinct types of felonies (each subdivided into 
aggravated and non-aggravated forms), either one or both felonies 
being infirm because the felony merged into or was included 
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, thin the homicide as argued in Point VII, immediately 
f,dlowing. Even if not merged or included, there is no way to 
tell if the jury was unanimous because of duplicity. It is still 
impossible to tell whether the jury was unanimous in finding 
the murder occurred in the commission of a burglary or an 
arson. 
VII 
A CAPITAL CONVICTION CANNOT BE OBTAINED UNDER 
THE FELONY-MURDER RULE WHEN THE FELONY IS 
MERGED OR INCLUDED IN THE MURDER ITSELF. 
Appellant moved, pre-trial, to quash or reduce the 
Information on the grounds that a lesser-included offense could 
not constitute one of the dual prongs of the felony-murder rule. 
(Record at 68-91 and 121-130) He asserted similar grounds in 
support of his motion for a new trial (Record at 357) and 
requested instructions aimed at this point. (Record at 156-157) 
The Information charged Capital Homicide based on felony-murder, 
Section 76-5-202 (1) (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The felonies alleged were burglary, aggravated burglary, arson 
or aggravated arson. 
The facts relevant to these motions are not 
substantially disputed. Ms. Sagars testified that the sole 
purpose for entry into the victim's home was to commit a 
hum1c1de. (Tr. 491-492) She also testified that the victim's 
bed was set on fire to finish (at her advice) or hide the murder, 
(Tr. 1/7, 488-493) The jury was instructed according to the 
statutory definitions of burglary, aggravated burglary, arson 
and aggravated arson (Record at 197, 198), as well as the 
elements of the felony-murder rule. (Record at 194) 
The felony-murder rule is set forth in Section 
76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (prior to the 
1983 amendments): 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
first degree if the actor intentionally and 
knowingly causes the death of another under 
any of the following circumstances: 
* * * 
(d) The homicide was committed while 
the actor was engaged in the commission of, 
or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, 
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, forcible 
sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault, 
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, 
burglary, aggravated kidnapping or 
kidnapping. 
The statute was amended post-trial to include 
additional felonies within the felony-murder rule as well as 
other changes. 
In People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927), 
Justice Cardozo succinctly stated appellant's position as 
follows: 
The felony that eliminates the quality 
of the intent must be one that is independent 
of the homicide and of the assault merged 
therein, as e.g. robbery or larceny or 
burglary or rape. Id. 158 N.E. at 36 
To require otherwise would mean ". . that every 
homicide, not justifiable or excusable, would occur in the 
commission of felony, with the result that intent to kill anc 
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Jeliberation and premeditation would never be essential." 
( l bid.) 
403 P.2d 540 (Ariz., 1965), 
defendant was charged and convicted of first degree murder 
pursuant to the felony-murder rule on the grounds the defendant 
feloniously assaulted his wife with a gun resulting in her 
death. On appeal the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the act 
of assault merged into the resultant homicide. The assault could 
not be deemed a "separate and independent offense which could 
support a conviction for felony murder." at 545 citing 
People v. Moran, supra) 
Of similar import is State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 
(Ore., 1966), wherein the issue on appeal was the propriety of 
a "felony-murder" instruction when the only felony was the 
included assault with a dangerous weapon. The state in that 
case contended that ". .the felony need not be a collateral 
one, but that any included felony to entitle the state to an 
instruction on felony murder." 767) The Court flatly 
disagreed, distinguishing collateral felonies from included 
felonies. For example, a felonious assault upon a police officer 
resulting in the death of an intervening citizen is a 
relony-murder; however, absent intervention, the death of a 
police officer, without more, is not a felony-murder. (Utah's 
present statute has elevated homicide of a public official to 
a capital offense. Section 76-5-202, Vol. 8C, Pocket 
Supplement.) 
7 ' 
The California court addressed the issue to 
70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580 
(1969), wherein the court reversed a felony-murder conviction 
in which the underlying felony was assault with a deadly weapon. 
The court ruled that the felony-murder doctrine has no 
application to situations wherein the felony portion of the rule 
cons is ts of the f e 1 on i o us ass au 1 t upon the victim, " . . a 
category which includes the great majority of all homicides." 
(450 P.2d at 590) The California court adopted the doctrine 
to void bootstrapping by the prosecution in cases where the 
felony is ". part of the homicide and which 
the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense 
included within the offense charged." (Footnote 
omitted, first emphasis added, second emphasis by the Court.) 
With respect to felony-murder based on a burglary, 
the court overruled (to the extent inconsistent with the opinion) 
two prior cases which had permitted ". .a first degree 
felony-murder instruction based upon a burglary as to which the 
intended felony is the homicide itself of an offense included 
therein." (Id. 450 P.2d at 590-591) 
In 1 Cal. 3d 4 31, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 
462 P.2d 22 (1969), the court addressed the precise issue at 
bar; to-wit: Whether the felony-murder rule could be supported 
by burglary as the underlying felony when the purpose of entry 
was to commit an assault upon the murdered occupant. The court 
held that a conviction for felony-murder cannot be based upor 
1e 
4, 
at 
. ec 
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, predicated upon assaultive intent, stating: 
Here the prosecution sought to apply 
the felony-murder rule on the theory that 
the homicide occurred in the course of a 
burglary, but the only basis for finding 
a felonious entry is the intent to commit 
and assault with a deadly weapon. When, 
as here, the entry would be non-felonious 
but for the intent to commit the assault, 
and the assault is an integral part of the 
homicide and is included in fact in the 
offense charged, utilization of the 
felony-murder rule extends that doctrine 
'beyond any rational function that it is 
designed to serve'. We have heretofore 
emphasized 'that the felony-murder doctrine 
expresses a highly artificial concept that 
deserves no extension beyond its required 
application." (People v. Phillips, (1966), 
supra, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 
232, 414 P.2d 353, 360) 
'The purpose of the felony-murder rule 
is to deter felons from killing negligently 
or accidentally by holding them strictly 
responsible for killings they commit.' 
(1965), 62 Cal.2d 
777, 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 
130, 133) Where a person enters a building 
with an intent to assault his victim with 
a deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the 
felony-murder rule. The doctrine can serve 
its purpose only when applied to a felony 
independent of the homicide. In Ireland, 
we reasoned that a man assaulting-another 
with a deadly weapon could not be deterred 
by the second degree felony-murder rule, 
since the assault was an integral part of 
the homicide. Here, the only distinction 
is that the assault and homicide occurred 
inside a dwelling so that the underlying 
felony is burglary based on an intention 
to assault with a deadly weapon, rather than 
simply assault with a deadly weapon. (Id • 
462 P.2d at 28) 
The California Supreme Court in 
ur' 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (1980) again reviewed the 
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felony-murder rule. Ir, tr1at casP, the defendant forced his wife 
to a secluded area, caused her to disrobe and killed her some 
20-30 minutes later. Defendant took the clothes and personal 
valuables of the victim. He admitted to sexual intercourse 
immediately prior to the murder. 
The State charged Green with capital murder alleging 
that the homicide was committed (1) during the commission of 
the robbery; and (2) during the commission of a kidnapping. 
Finding the felony-murder applied predicated on the robbery, 
the jury imposed death. On appeal the court reversed, holding 
that a murder is not committed during a robbery within the 
meaning of the statute unless the accused has "killed in cold 
blood in order to advance an independent, felonious purpose; 
e.g., [has] "carried out an execution-style slaying of the victim 
of or witness to a holdup, a kidnapping or a rape." (609 P.2d 
505) A special circumstance allegation of murder committed 
during a robbery has not been established where the accused's 
(609 P.2d at 505) The Court concluded: 
In the case at hand, for example, it 
would not rationally distinguish between 
murderers to hold that this defendant can 
be subjected to the death penalty because 
he took his victim's clothing for the purpose 
o f b u r n i n g i t 1 a t e r t o p r e v e n t 
identification, when another defendant who 
committed an identical first degree murder 
could not be subjected to the death penalty 
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if for the same purpose he buried the victim 
fully clothed--or even if he doused the 
clothed body with gaoline and burned it at 
the scene instead. To permit a jury to 
choose who will live and who wil die on the 
basis of whether in the course of committing 
murder the defendant happens 
constitutes robbery__.2.!._Qne o! 
the other listed felonies would be to revive 
'the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious 
action' condemned by the high court plurality 
l!l_Greg;i. (428 U.S. at p. 189, 96 S.Ct. at 
p. 2932) We conclude that regardless of 
w1th1n the meaning of the statute. 
(Emphasis added.) (Ibid.) 
In v. Thompson, 165 Cal.Rptr. 898, 166 P.2d 
883 (1980), decided three months after supra, the 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder, robbery and first 
burglary, all arising out of an incident technically 
involving robbery and burglary but in which the primary goal 
was a homicide. The penalty was death. 
The court stated at page 894: 
The question presented under People 
v. Green is whether the shootings were done 
to-advance an independent felonious purpose 
of stealing the car and keys or whether 
instead such intended thefts were 'merely 
incidental to the murder.' Viewing the 
record as a whole in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdicts, as this court must, 
it is impossible to conclude that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proof 
on this issue. 
The perpetrator's final remark to his 
victims as he held the pillow in front of 
his gun--' you know why I'm here and you know 
who sent me'--undeniably indicates that this 
confrontation was intended primarily {if 
not exclusively) to be a killing. The man's 
7h 
refusal without apparent reason to accept 
any of the victim's jewelry strongly imports 
that property gain was at most secondary 
importance. 
As in and supra, the 
of Carla Sagars and the appellant was to kill 
the victim with the hatchet or axe, and the fire was 
incidental to the murder because the fire was set to conceal 
the .er imary er ime (murder). In fact, the testimony of Carla 
Sagars clearly shows that it was her desire to set the fire and 
to put cigarette butts around the fire area to make it look like 
the victim had been smoking in bed and the death caused by 
accidental means. (Tr. 1/6, 488-49 3) The application of the 
felony-murder rule; i.e., increasing the degree of the crime 
from second degree murder to first degree murder by virtue of 
the abortive intent to destroy the crime scene with an arson, 
is plainly prohibited and, as stated in Qreen, "would revive 
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action condemned 
by the high court plurality 
The other aggravating circumstance alleged in the 
Information, to-wit: burglary or aggravated burglary, is 
similarly incidental to the homicide. The entry into the 
victim's home was made solely for the purpose of carrying out 
the criminal goal of Carla Sagars and the appellant 
to kill. In Thom.eson, the killer entered the victims' home 
armed with a gun and shot his two victims and used the ruse of 
robbery to cover his primary motive; i.e., that he was sent tc 
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lie victims' home to kill them, not to steal their property. 
Jn the killer entered the apartment with felonious 
1 ntent (a burglary) to commit an assault upon the decedent. 
There is no question here that if the victim had not died, Carla 
Sagars and the appellant would be guilty of aggravated burglary 
because they did enter the residence, caused physical injury 
to the victim and were armed with a deadly weapon. However, 
the crimes of burglary or aggravated burglary were "merely 
incident to the murder" supra), and 
secondary to the primary criminal goal of murder. The State 
has elected to charge murder in the first degree, a capital 
felony, alleging that the homicide was committed "during the 
commission" of a burglary, aggravated burglary, arson or 
aggravated arson when in fact the reverse has been shown; i.e., 
that the burglary and/or arson was committed "during the 
commission" of a homicide and was secondary to the E.£lmary 
criminal goal of homicide. 
Burglary is a completed offense the moment entry is 
made with the requisite felonious intent. (Section 76-6-202, 
Utah Code Annotated) In State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah, 
1981), the court upheld a burglary conviction based purely on 
enttf with an inferred felonious intent. 
Once the offense of burglary is completed, the homicide 
cannot have occurred "in the commission of" the burglary as 
required by the felony-murder rule. Mere temporal proximity 
ought not to elevate the homicide to a capital offense. (See 
generally 58 A.L.R.3d 851, Felony-MurdPr Rule, "Termination of 
Felony", p. 851-987, for extensive discussion.) The United 
States Supreme Court may decide the issue in Murphy v. Texas, 
cert. granted 35 C.L. 4067. 
For the foregoing reasons, the capital conviction in 
this case cannot be supported by the felony-murder rule charged 
in the Information when the underlying felony or felonies were 
either completed, merged into the homicide or included in fact 
in the homicide. The evidence and the law can only permit, at 
most, a conviction of Second Decree Murder, first degree felony. 
The Court should reverse and remand for imposition of the 
appropriate sentence. 
VIII 
SECTION 76-3-207, U.C.A., IS CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE 
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO LIMIT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND PERMITS THE JURY TO RELY ON ANY FACTS IN AGGRAVATION. 
Prior to commencement of penalty proceedings, the State 
filed a notice of intent to introduce aggravating factors during 
penalty phase including prior felony convictions, parole status, 
prior incarcerations and statutory aggravating circumstances 
based on the felony-murder rule of Section 76-5-202(d), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (as of trial date). 
Defendant-appellant filed a notice prior to the penalty phase 
to the effect he would not seek to rely on lack of criminal 
history in mitigation and objected verbally to introduction of 
conviction evidence. (Tr. 1/20, 14 and 68) 
Witnesses for the State testified concerning 
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prior criminal convictions and appellant's parole 
status at the time of the offense. (Tr. 1/20, 5-20) 
At commencement of the penalty phase, the Court 
instructed the jury in almost the precise language of the 
sentencing statute (Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated) that 
any evidence having probative force may be received regardless 
of its admissibility. (Tr. 1/20, 2-3) The typed instructions 
tendered to the jury (Record at 268) and read to them (Tr. 1/20, 
73) also advised the jury that any facts in aggravation could 
be presented. (Instruction No. 4) Instruction No. 6 (Record 
at 270) then stated "You may consider as aggravating 
circumstances the which you found to be present 
as elements of the offense of 
first-degree murder in the guilt phase." (Emphasis added.) 
And also Instruction No. 7, (Record at 271) "You may consider 
as aggravating circumstances any other evidence admitted at 
trial •.. and any other facts in aggravation .•.. " 
follows: 
Section 76-3-207 provides, in pertinent part, as 
In these proceedings, evidence may be 
presented as to any matter the court deems 
relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence 
the court deems to have probative force may 
be received regardless of its admissibility 
under the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
Aggravating circumstances shall 
include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Section 76-5--202, Lr>fet1ed le, in the quoted statute, 
is the substantive Murder tn tile Fust 1)eqree statute under which 
appellant was charged with felony-murder as the aggravating 
circumstance. 
The jury did not specify which one or more aggravating 
circumstances it relied upon as grounds for imposition of 
death penalty. (See Point VI, infra, re duplicity.) 
Allowing a jury to determine whether to impose the 
death penalty on the basis of "any facts in aggravation" clearly 
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . i n r i.sJ:l! , 6 6 1 F . 2 d 5 6 ( 5 th 
Cir., 1981), reh. 686 F.2d 311 (1982), cer. granted 457 U.S. 
1114, 73 L.Ed.2d 1326, 102 S.Ct. 2922 (1983) In Henry the 
Fifth Circuit Court held that the consideration of non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances required another sentencing procedure 
when the initial sentencing procedure involved jury instructions 
similar to the case at bar. For the jury to consider any 
aggravating circumstance violated the mandates of Fuhrman v. 
Georgia, supra, and its progeny. 
A different statutory scheme subject to the same 
infirmity was involved in Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 
(5th Cir., 1982), reh. den. 688 F.2d 395 (1982), wherein the 
jury was not limited in its consideration of aggravating 
circumstances. 
Cir., 1982). 
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To the extent Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended, permits the jury to consider "any other facts 
in aggravation," the statute is constitutionally infirm because 
it fails to adequately". .channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary 
and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in 
Fuhrman could occur." 428 U.S. 153 at 195 
n. 46, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976)) 
Not only was the jury instructed that it could rely 
on any other fact in aggravation, but it was also instructed 
that the aggravating circumstance of felony-murder, upon which 
they could rely to impose the death penalty, had already been 
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant, on the 
other hand, sought to limit introduction of prior convictions 
of defendant via a notice of intent not to claim lack of criminal 
history in mitigation. 
The total effect of the instructions was one which 
virtually mandated death unless the appellant was able to step 
forward to give a compelling reason why the death penalty should 
0.2! be imposed. This Court has held that a life sentence must 
he presumed until the prosecution has sustained its burden. 
iStare v. Pierre, supra) 
When the statutory language is juxtaposed on the 
instructions, an unextraordinary homicide results in the first 
Jeath penalty verdict in Salt Lake County in many years. The 
Jury decision was an abberation, and can only be viewed as 
8' 
capricious. The statute a11d i11slruct1ons failed adequately tc, 
channel the sentencing process. 
IX 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN WERE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AND COULD NOT BE HARMLESS ERROR. 
Appellant's counsel requested and the Court read and 
tendered a reasonable doubt instruction during the guilt phase 
which defined reasonable doubt as: 
Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a 
doubt that is based on reason and one which 
is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from the evidence or the 
lack of evidence in this case. (Record at 
148) 
Both phases of trial also demanded the jury to asses: 
guilt and penalty in terms of reasonable doubt defined as 
follows: "A reasonable doubt must be a real substantial doubt 
and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The foregoing definitions have long-standing use it 
the experience of the undersigned; however, such does not an: 
should not excuse the error in requesting the instruction an. 
the court's use of the instruction, which now appears, ir 
retrospect, to shift the burden to defendant-appellant. In 
570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir., 1978), the instruction a: 
issue was held to be error of constitutional magnitude. In tha: 
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, 's"' the instruction required ". .a reasonable person [to] 
or suggest a good and sufficient reason." (Id. 23, En. 1) 
The Court concluded that standing alone, the instruction might 
not be reversible error, although improper in itself. When 
coupled with other definitions requiring a strong and abiding 
conviction, not some fanciful or trivial doubt, the instruction 
as a whole was patently erroneous and an error of constitutional 
magnitude. (Id. 23-24) 
The right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal trial (and the penalty phase under modern bifurcated 
statutes) .has long been assumed. .constitutionally 
required." (In re 397 U.S. 358 at 362, 25 L.Ed.2d 
368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970), (numerous citations omitted)) And 
quoting from Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 at 484, the 
Court in Winship noted: 
.No man should be deprived of his 
life under the forms of law unless the jurors 
who try him are able, upon their consciences, 
to say that the evidence before them .•• is 
sufficient to show beyond a reasonble doubt 
the existence of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged. !9_. at 363 
The Court expressly held that the reasonable doubt standard was 
required by the Due Process Clause. (Id. 364) 
Although the Court in Dunn v. Perrin, supra, reserved 
fur another day whether or not an erroneous reasonable doubt 
instruction could ever be harmless 25), 
C a , 3 8 6 u . S . 18 , 1 7 L . Ed . 2 d 7 0 5 , 8 7 S . C t. 8 2 4 ( 19 6 6 ) , 
held that errors of constitutional magnitude require scrutiny 
to determine whether the er101 d1J nut, beyond a reasonble doubt, 
contribute to the conv1ct1on before being held harmless. 
Appellant submits this standard analogously applies to the 
penalty phase of trial as well inasmuch as the very life of 
appellant was at stake. The quote in supra, 
quoted above is particularly appropriate. 
The instructions at issue herein are closely analogous 
to those in supra. The jury was required to find a 
"real, substantial doubt" before acquitting appellant or before 
imposing a life sentence. The jury was required to find an 
articulate reason for the doubt. 
The cumulative effect of the entire instruction in 
each phase was an impermissible shift in the burden of proof. 
The prosecution burden was eased by the requirements or 
articulation and elevation to a "real, substantial" doubt. The 
penalty phase was constitutionally tainted, requiring remand 
since to require otherwise is to advance the proposition that 
there can be harmless constitutional error when imposing the 
death sentence. 
x 
APPELLANT'S JURY PANEL UNDERREPRESENTED 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 
App e 11 an t ' s co u n s e l , a s r e q u i red by 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 639 
P.2d 168 (1981), and mindful of Section 78-46-16, Utah Code 
Annotated (Pocket Supplement, 1983), presents the authority anc 
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.,ryument therefor below. 
A criminal defendant has the right to a jury selected 
from a fair cross-section of the community. 
439 U.S. 35, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979)) 
Exclusion of a distinct class or race from the jury panel is 
constitutional error. Carter v. Commission of Greene 
396 U.S. 320, 24 L.Ed.2d 549, 90 S.Ct. 518 (1970). 
For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 42 L.Ed.2d 
690, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975), the systematic exclusion of women from 
the jury venire deprived the appellant therein of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial because of the failure to effect 
a fair cross-section of the community. 
The triple-pronged test of the "fair cross-section" 
rule is set forth in Duren, supra, and requires the following: 
(1) the group allegedly excluded is 
distinctive in the community; 
(2) the distinctive group's 
representation in the venire vis-a-vis the 
community is not fair and reasonable; and 
(3) underrepresentation of the group 
is due to systematic exclusion in the 
selection process. 
The foregoing three factors, if demonstrated, present 
a pr1ma facia violation of the fair cross-section rule and can 
Ge rebutted only by demonstrating a significant state interest 
advanced in the particular selection process. (Id. 439 U.S. at 
176-368) 
In the case of CR-83-1314, et al., 
Third Judicial District, S3lt County, State of Utah, 
defendant therein alleged, and appellant herein adopts the 
argument that Hispanics are a distinct community group which, 
during the period of January 1, 1983, through March 31, 1983, 
(during which time appellant stood trial), were systematically 
excluded from the jury venire as indicated by the actual number 
of Hispanic surnames (43) on the panel compared to the 
statistically anticipated number of Hispanics (99 or 4.98%) on 
the panel. The apparent exclusion of some 56+% of a distinctive 
group could be the result of a systematic exclusion under the 
jury selection system in place. The undersigned knows of no 
simple method to record and demonstrate the underrpresentation 
of Blacks, Hispanics, young adults or other distinctive groups 
since ethnic and other distinctive statistics are not maintained 
by the court with respect to the jury venire. 
Records maintained at the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
office reflect that during January of 1983, some 1206 prospective 
jurors were contacted resulting in the disqualification of 260 
(21.55%) and excusal of 23 (1.90%) for total exclusion of 283 
(23.45%) Similarly, February 1983 showed 21.45% excluded due 
to 18.73% disqualiCicat1on and 2.72% excusal and March 1983 
showed 27.24% excluded via 21.9% disqualification and 5.33% 
excusal. The calendar year 1983 averaged 26.66% exclusion. 
No records of ethnic origin, reason for disqualification or 
reason for excusal were maintained thereby rendering virtually 
impossible any means to compare distinctive social groups. 
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Appellant submits that the three-pronged test of 
supra, has been met as demonstrated below. 
A. Hispanics are a distinctive group under the 
criteria of 583 P.2d 69 {Utah, 1978), in 
that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the Mexican-
descent group as distinctive. {Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
475, 98 L.Ed. 866, 74 S.Ct. 667 (1954)) Although the 
relationship of the Mexican-descent group to the Hispanic group 
is unknown to the undersigned, the former should constitute a 
substantial portion of the latter and hence bear some reasonably 
substantial correlation to Census Bureau statistics relied on. 
Blacks are a distinctive group as well. 
F.2d 1212 {11th Cir., 1983)) 
{Willis v. Zant, 720 
B. Hispanics are underrepresented in the venire. 
According to counsel in Bishop, supra, review indicated more 
than half of the statistically expected Hispanics did not appear 
on the venire when reviewing the record for Hispanic surnames. 
C. The group is underrepresented through systematic 
exclusion. Although mechanics of systematic exclusion are 
unknown to the undersigned and review of juror records at the 
rlerk's office reflect only gross statistics, such statistics 
show an average of 26.6% are excused, thereby providing a vehicle 
uf some sort to effectuate systematic exclusion. 
In supra, the Court held a Georgia 
death-row inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 
demonstrate his allegations that young adults and Blacks were 
systematically excluded from Georgia Jut1es. 
At minimum, appellant is entitled to a hearing, after 
opportunity for discovery, to present evidence in support of 
his contentions. Appellant should be given the opportunity to 
obtain any evidence in support thereof by the appointment of 
separate counsel and such other experts and resources necessary 
to establish the claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was deprived of a fair trial because of 
impermissible comments upon his failure to testify and his 
inability to adduce evidence tending to show deception by the 
State's primary witness testifying under a grant of immunity. 
Appellant's sentence is grossly disproportionate to treatment 
of the accomplice and others convicted of homicide. The sentencE 
was imposed absent meaningful comparison to the alternative life 
sentence. The Information was duplicitous and was based on a 
felony murder wherein the felony had merged into the murder. 
Instructions shifted the burden of proof without limiting 
aggravating factors. 
Each error warrants reversal. The cumulative weigh; 
of all errors must compel reversal of all proceedings with 
appropriate remand for new trial, sentencing procedures c 
imposition of a life sentence. 
Appellant has alleged numerous errors and filed 
lengthy brief in support thereof in the belief the record shou: 
reflect not only issues raised at trial but also reflect tr 
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mistakes of counsel at trial and reflect the benefit of hindsight 
in the hope procedural defaults of counsel will not prejudice 
the client. If counsel has burdened the Court, he apologizes; 
but if in so doing he has advanced the interests and rights of 
his client, he has in some small measure discharged his duties 
to his client, the Court and the people of the State of Utah 
and society's interest in achieving true and humane justice. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1984. 
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